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Abstract
DOLILU II is a ground control system that generates space shuttle’s launch
trajectories, first stage guidance commands and verifies whether the generated
trajectories are safe for the flight. It is a safety critical system and a high degree of
confidence in its safety and reliability must be gained through assessment. We addressed
three issues related to its safety and reliability assessment. We developed a reliability
assessment framework for DOLILU II system. We proposed techniques to speed up test
case execution and designed methodologies for the generation of input conditions needed
to test the system.
We used a Bayesian statistical framework for reliability assessment. Bayesian
statistics uses knowledge about the system to be incorporated into the reliability model
before testing. DOLILU II has been operational for nearly five years. We use this
information when developing the reliability model. This information is introduced in the
form of prior beliefs.
DOLILU II system requires an average time of 30 minutes for each test run. This
translates into a large time period required for testing to demonstrate that DOLILU II
exhibits the required failure rate. Vertical slicing, a semantic transformation technique, is
used to prove the possibility of parallel execution and enhance each test case execution.
DOLILU II is an on-demand system. Many test trajectories are needed for its
assessment. Regression methods were used to develop models for the generation of input
data.
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1.0

Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview

1.1

Introduction
From Blaise Pascal’s modest invention of the first adding machine, to present day

fast computing machines; computers have undergone a significant metamorphosis.
Starting with the big bulky computers (UNIVAC, ENIAC) that cost over a million
dollars to fast desktop machines available today, they have progressed slowly from
solving problems of the scientific community, to permeate all occupations.
With computers becoming increasingly indispensable, there exists growing
awareness about the “untrustworthiness” of one of man’s greatest inventions. Though
computer systems firmware consists of both hardware and software, there has been more
emphasis on how much one’s reliance on software can be trusted. There are several
factors that abet this cause. The chief one that plagues software engineering unlike other
major engineering disciplines, including even computer hardware, is that they have a
more disciplined approach to both designing and addressing problems that persist in their
fields. There is generally a predictable life span for a given hardware product. It can be
modeled as a decaying rate of efficiency at which the product will deliver service.
Software, on the other hand, cannot be attributed with any of these factors. Most
disciplines are characterized by having a strong mathematical backbone they can rely on,
a simplistic design process and a more gradual change attaching more reliability to the
products thus evolved.
Design of software based systems is characterized by inherent “complexity” of
software involved. Idiosyncratic nature of software have been exhibited by one and all
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computer systems. Despite several fallacies, there is still a widespread acceptance of
software. The tolerance towards software failures is inversely proportional to the cost a
person is willing to pay for the software.
Failures in certain systems, however, are unacceptable. We may classify them into
two categories
• Money critical systems: systems that fall into this category are transaction
processing like banking software, telecommunications like networking systems
deployed for stock exchanges. Erroneous data processing could lead to
bankruptcy of a firm!
• Safety Critical Systems: software systems controlling/monitoring process control
systems like nuclear power plants, chemical plants, satellite software, flight
control. These systems are characterized by an enormous capital investment in
creating them and a failure that could endanger human life. In this thesis, we
deal with systems belonging to this category.

1.2

Software Usage And Experiences
Bev Littlewood and Lorenzo Stringini expressed their views regarding the

deployment of software in “systems where software is critical for safety”. In their
article[3], they delineated their growing concern, emphasizing the shortfall to guarantee
software correctness. They state “an appropriate level of safety can only be granted if the
applicability of software manning critical process is limited”. Despite several problems
that cripple software, it is still been used in several areas inclusive of process control
environments. The main advantage is that it allows a great degree of flexibility when
subsequent changes needs to be done to the system. Furthermore, automation of
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equipment in environments like nuclear power plants decrease the risk of the human user
controlling the process from exposure to hazardous radiation.
There is an adage that goes “one learns from one’s own experiences”. The best
way to know how software behaves when actually put to use is gathered only from field
experiences [3]. To attest to this fact, we may quote several examples where, software
failure has not only wasted enormous capital investment but also endangered and killed
human life. The following subsections relate these very instances.
1.2.1 Ariane 5
The maiden flight of Ariane5 (European Space Agency), launcher ended in a
failure on 4 June 1996. The launcher veered off its intended flight course, broke up and
exploded. The board documented the proceedings of the investigation [4]. The Flight
Control Systems on Ariane5 measured the altitude movements of the spacecraft in space
by an Inertial Reference System (SRI). The data from the SRI was conveyed through a
databus to the On-board Computer (OBC). The OBC executes the flight program and
controls the nozzles of the solid boosters and cryogenic engine through hydraulic
actuators and servovalves. In order to improve reliability, there were two SRI's operating
in parallel with identical hardware and software. The design of Ariane5 SRI was
practically the same as on its predecessor and hence the software was reused.
After about 40 seconds into flight, due to an angle of attack of more than 20
degrees high aerodynamic loads were caused. This in turn led to the separation of the
boosters from the main stage, triggering the self-destruct system.
The angle of attack was caused by full nozzle deflections of the solid boosters and
Vulcain main engine. This was commanded by the OBC on data that was received from
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the SRI system. This was because of a bit pattern from SRI 2 that was misconstrued to be
the flight data.
An internal software exception was generated on SRI 1 when a data conversion
from a 64-bit floating point to a 16-bit integer was made. SRI 1 shut down transferring
control to SRI 2. SRI 2 also detected the same fault but could not switch back to the SRI
1. SRI 2 hence conveyed incorrect flight data to OBC. The error occurred in the part of
the software that only performs alignment strap-down inertial platform. This software
provides meaningful information only before the lift off. This function was, by mistake,
operational for 40 seconds into flight. This time sequence was a requirement in Ariane4
but not in Ariane5. The operand error resulted in a high value of Horizontal Bias (BH),
related to horizontal velocity. The value of BH was higher than expected for Ariane5 as
the early part of the trajectory was different from Ariane4. This cascade led to the
destruction of the launcher.
1.2.2 Mars Climate Orbiter
On December 11, 1998, NASA launched the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) with
the objective to observe the planets surface, profile the structure of the atmosphere, and
detect surface reservoirs. This was a part of the Mars Surveyor Program started in
1993.[5]
Nine and half months into the flight, on September 1999, MCO was to fire its
main engine to achieve an elliptical orbit around mars. A technique called
“aerobreaking” was being used to maneuver the flight through Mars’ upper atmosphere,
to reduce velocity and move into circular orbit. On September 23 1999, MCO mission
was lost when it entered the atmosphere on lower trajectory than expected.
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The board investigated the mishap and proposed the following reasons for the
failure. On September 8 1999, the interplanetary Trajectory Correction Maneuver-4
(TCM-4) was planned. This maneuver was expected to adjust the trajectory such that
after the orbital insertion burn the point closest to the planet would be at a distance of 226
km. The data was up-linked to the orbiter in metadata files (AMD files). The on-board
computer computed the orbital insertion distance. TCM-4 was executed as planned on
September 15, 1999. Mars orbit insertion (MOI) was planned for September 23. During
this period, orbit determination processing by the navigation team received data
indicating that the first periapse distance had decreased to the range of 150-170km. 24
hours before MOI, MCO began to feel strong effects of Mars’ gravitational field. Before
one hour of MOI, first periapse altitude was 110 km.
The MOI was started and all systems performed nominally until Mars’ occultation
loss of signal. Signal was to be reacquired after the 21-minute interval predicted for the
occultation period. There was no retrieval.
On September 27, 1999, the operations navigation team discussed navigation
discrepancies regarding velocity change modeling issues. After two days it was found
that the small forces, ∆V’s, used in orbit determination on the orbiter before the
initialization burn (MOI) was low by a factor of 4.45 (1 pound force = 4.45 Newton). The
impulse bit data contained in the AMD file was delivered in lb.-sec instead of expected
units Newton-sec.
After navigation estimates, using available data through loss of signal, with
corrected values the initial periapsis of 57 km was calculated which was too low for the
spacecraft survival. The estimated minimum altitude for survival was 80km.
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1.3

Motivation
Safety in today’s technological terms seems akin to the notion of “risk”. R.N.

Charette [9] defined risk as an action/event having the following characteristics
•

Having a loss associated with it

•

Where uncertainty or chance is involved

•

Some choice is also involved

Safety based on the above observations may be phrased as “ freedom from exposure to
danger, or the exemption from hurt or loss” [11].
Several safety-critical systems follow this description. These systems require a
very high degree of confidence in their functioning. With so much at stake, a rigorous
framework of development is deemed essential when dealing with such high consequence
systems. Assurance of specifications was the first step taken to ensure the correctness of
requirements for the system. Languages like Z [20] have been successfully used to
formally specify the requirements thereby minimizing design errors that might creep in
due to an incorrect requirement definition document. Furthermore, to achieve greater
reliability by masking faults introduced at the design phase of the project, design diversity
[26] was adopted leading to fault tolerant and fault preventive systems [6]. Consequently,
these systems seldom exhibit failures. The question now arises, are all the above factors
sufficient to attest that the software will function without failures? When such a high
degree of dependability is a requirement, when subversion of the system could cause a
loss of life, it becomes apparent that one needs to endorse that the system indeed satisfies
the reliability requirement.
.
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Our work involved in developing assessment methods for NASA’s Day of
Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU II) system. The system evaluates trajectory parameters
against the I-Loads (Initialization Loads) that dictate the guidance commands for the
space shuttle. Wrongly approved trajectories and guidance commands could lead to the
destruction of the space shuttle. This system was a high consequence system.
Rigorous development methodologies were adopted to develop the system.
During each phase in the software life cycle, stringent and scrupulous techniques were
followed to ensure proper design and development (the requirements and design phase
went through 8 levels before final approval). During the verification and validation phase,
however, methodologies only stress tested the system with no effort to quantify the
reliability of the system. Furthermore, the system has been operational for the past 5
years. This gave us an opportunity to analyze the system and also develop a framework to
assess its reliability.
We looked into several theories that have been proposed over the years on
estimating the reliability of software in safety critical systems. They could be classified
into three main categories
•

Formal methods

•

Exhaustive testing

•

Statistical testing
Formal methods have their genesis in years of mathematical formulation. The

underlying paradigm is that a program meets the “correctness” requirement if it satisfies
its intended purpose. In other words, it is said to be functionally correct if it behaves
according to the specifications. Program correctness is an absolute measure; the program
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under verification is either valid or invalid. There is no quantification of reliability; it is
either zero or one.
The drawback with this method is the assumption that the specifications
themselves are correct in nature. A correct implementation of a specification may still
lead to unreliable execution of program due to an imperfect specification [10] . It’s
tedious to provide proofs for complex systems. Hence it was difficult to formally verify
the entire DOLILU II system.
The more traditional way to estimate reliability of software is testing. Huang et al.
[12] stated in his paper that exhaustive testing is impossible as it is difficult to cover the
entire input domain for complex systems, to ensure complete execution of all paths in a
program. With a complex system like DOLILU II, this methodology was ruled out.
In this thesis we lay emphasis on the third form of software assessment based on
statistical testing techniques. These models perform repeated executions of software to
provide a certain level of confidence that the required degree of reliability has been
successfully achieved.
There were several challenges that we were posed with applying statistical
methods to DOLILU II system.


Our discussions with the NASA IV&V personnel revealed that DOLILU system
required a demonstration of probability of failure less than 10-5. With a statistical
assessment framework this would translate into a large number of test cases.
However, we had information regarding the development process, the testing that had
already been done and the fact that the system has been in operational use for several
years. We needed an assessment framework, which would incorporate this
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information into our assessment model to determine an acceptable time frame to
assess the system.


After developing a framework for assessment, we now needed to have sufficient
inputs generated to test the system.



As the execution time for DOLILU II was in the order of minutes, we needed to
decrease the time required for each test case execution

1.4

Thesis Overview
The remaining thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 overviews existing

reliability assessment techniques. Chapter 3 analyzes the different systems that comprise
the DOLILU II system. Emphasis is laid on DIVDT (Day of launch I-Load Verification
Table). This chapter also enumerates the different techniques that have been used to
evaluate the working of DIVIDT, inclusive of test plans and their executions.
Chapter 4 introduces the notion of reliability as applicable to software. A
comparison is made between classical sampling theory and Bayesian inference,
delineating the merits of the Bayesian approach and its implications on assessing
ultrahigh reliability for software based systems.
Chapter 5 describes the use of slicing techniques to split the system into subparts,
and demonstrate the accelerated test case execution of the DIVIDT subsystem.
Chapter 6 address issues for auto generation of test cases. Here we explore
regression methodologies that could be adopted for generation of input conditions. It also
addresses issues regarding oracles.
Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and suggests further work and other approaches
for evaluating the system.
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2.0

Chapter 2: Related Work
Historically, software creation has been viewed as a two-stage process. The first is

the translation of requirements from informal description into formal specifications.
Second is the translation of specifications into executable code.
When viewing this two-tier hierarchy one realizes that, there are at least two
processes where faults can be introduced. The main problem with achieving such high
reliability is the probability that subtle design faults always exist [13]. Design faults arise
due to incorrect understanding of requirements or due to omission in the specification
stage. Implementation faults occur during the second phase due to insufficient testing,
verification and validation.
This leads to three schools of thought for ensuring the reliability of critical
software. One way is verifying the correctness of specifications, indicating that all
desirable properties were captured. The second group aims at masking the effect of faults.
Techniques belonging to this category are fault tolerance and fault prevention. The third
group of methods, applicable at the tail end of software life cycle, includes assessment
techniques that instill the confidence that the requirements of reliability are met [6].
The remaining part of this chapter illustrates reliability assessment techniques,
mainly statistical reliability assessment methods.

2.1

Reliability Assessment Methods
Techniques, like assurance of specifications, vouch for the correctness of the

specifications. They reflect that all the properties were captured. It improves the removal
of faults introduced during the requirement specification stage. Nevertheless, the question
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remains does it truly reflect the reliability of the system. One cannot assure that the
implementation and design were devoid of faults. One might however reduce any
ambiguity in understanding the specifications.
Fault Tolerant and Fault Preventive systems attempt at nullifying subtle design
errors that might encroach. They adopt design diversity, to decrease the faults in the
system. Fault tolerant systems appeals to the robustness of software. These types of
systems increase the reliability by making the software execute in an acceptable manner
for spurious inputs. This is achieved by having different versions of the software. Fault
Prevention strives to achieve the same by making comparisons of different designs and
then taking the union of them. These systems enhance the reliability, but they do not
provide any information that justifies the reliability level they claim to have achieved
There are two approaches to assess the reliability of software:
•

Static Assessment Analysis.

•

Dynamic Assessment Analysis.

Static analysis requires no execution of the program that is being analyzed.
Program verification uses mathematical logic to prove program correctness. It proves
beyond the element of doubt that the program functions as specified under all possible
input conditions, implying all execution conditions.
Dynamic assessment analysis adheres to the more conventional technique of
executing the program to check for conformance with specifications. The program
undergoing evaluation is subjected to different inputs. The outputs of the program are
then compared with the expected results for the tested inputs.
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2.1.1

Static Assessment Techniques
The main technique used for static assessment is formal verification. It is based on

reasoning whether a program will work in accordance to specifications using
mathematical proof checking. There are several theories that have matured over the years
and culminated in proper proving techniques. A few of these are Hoare’s axiomatic
method [34], Floyd’s inductive method [35] and structural induction [35][36]. Several
textbooks explain these methods in detail [35].
One of the chief drawbacks with formal verification is the lack of mechanized
proof verification tools [6]. To prove a program functionally correct, one manually
performs the proof. When dealing with high consequence systems, the complexity of the
software may be high. Consequently, this leads to two main problems. The proof turns
out to be tedious and, abiding by the adage “to err is human”, erroneous proofs can
result.
Another aspect is transcribing the program into mathematical models. With
increased complexity of systems and increased complexity of languages, it seems
difficult to apply formal techniques to assess the correct functioning.
In principle, reliability of software can be quantified either by formal verification
or by statistical testing. The requirements specification of DOLILU II was written in
plain English and no attempt was made to formalize it with any form of mathematical
notation. Furthermore, the size and complexity of the specification documents make
formal program verification virtually impossible. Therefore the assessment of the
DOLILU system was done by program testing.
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2.1.2

Dynamic Assessment Techniques
Several techniques have been proposed over the years that fall into this category.

Some of the notable ones are, fault based assessments and statistical based methods.
Voas, Miller and others [38] proposed fault injection techniques to assess reliability. In
this method, one physically injects faults into the program. The process is termed
software fault injection. The software is then tested to determine whether faults can be
detected. Intuitively, this form of testing gives us insight into the test coverage obtained
from test cases. For more information on this type of testing one might refer to
[6][38][37]. When dealing with safety critical systems, which have a tendency almost
never to fail, fault-based methods do not provide sufficient knowledge of the reliability of
software.
In this thesis, we shall deal with what is termed black box testing. In this type of
testing we treat the software as a black box and test it statistically until it satisfies the
reliability requirements.
Musa proposed, that, to quantify the reliability of the software we need to have a
proper, well-defined, approach towards testing. He suggested the use of operational
profiles to dictate testing [19]. Operational profiles portray the likely field use of the
software. He even illustrated how one may develop the operational profile by doing a
case study. Exhaustive testing is infeasible and testing alone does not guarantee the
absence of faults. The rationale behind Musa’s work is, if testing was directed by the
operational usage (operations that take place most often) of the software, the likelihood of
detecting faults is enhanced and thus, the reliability estimate becomes more realistic.

13

The major drawback is that it is difficult to determine the operational profile for
much software and it is difficult to predict the changes in the estimate of reliability, for
changes in the input profile. Interestingly, if one wanted to develop the operational
profile for DOLILU II system, it is noted that all the functions of the system need to be
exercised. The rules for evaluation may be divided into single point evaluation and a
range evaluation (for different parts of the trajectory). We shall now discuss the statistical
reliability assessment method.
2.1.2.1 Statistical Assessment Methods
In this thesis, we have used methods for evaluation of reliability of DOLILU II.
In this method of analysis, there are two approaches, black box approach and white box
approach. In the black box approach, the program under test is visualized as a function f
that maps all points in the input space into the corresponding points in the output space.
No knowledge of the implementation of the program is required. There is another school
of thought that uses the knowledge of the implementation (the code) to direct tests. This
methodology is termed white box testing. Here test cases are derived from the input based
on execution path coverage, or specifications. Both these methods divide the input
domain is into two portions, failure causing and non-failure causing inputs. We shall now
introduce the notion of reliability.
Intuitively, reliability is tied with failures, the more the number of failures the
lesser the reliability. If a total of n test runs were conducted and, of these, if nf inputs led
to incorrect results, according to the Nelson model, which derives the relationship
between reliability and the number of test cases executed, the estimated reliability R
(which is the proportion of right executions) is
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R =

n − nf

or

n

R = 1−

n

f

n

If number of test runs is large, n->∞, the fraction nf / n approaches zero, when nf is
significantly smaller than n. The above equation approaches unity. According to this
model, the more the test cases that are executed and the fewer failures one observes; the
higher is the reliability of the software.
Safety critical systems are characterized by a very high degree of dependability.
Development is rigorous in nature and the possibility of faults in design process is
reduced. Reliability assessment is done during the validation phase of the software life
cycle. Due to the nature of the software, it is unlikely that the software would exhibit
failures during final testing. Consider the case when we have executed 1000 test cases
and observed no failures (nf = 0), then, according to the Nelson model the estimate of
reliability is 1. The fraction nf / n is the failure probability. Is this a true estimate? The
question now arises, how do we predict the failure probability when we do not see any
failures?
Statistical assessment is done by selecting inputs randomly from the input domain
and testing the software. The foundation for this form of assessment lies in statistical
sampling theory [27]. Testing is done by randomly picking out inputs from the input
space. From statistical point of view this may be represented as a Bernoulli trial [6].
Reliability assessment assumes sampling with replacement for easier and economical
implementation of software testing. Since the input space is astronomical in size, the
probability of selecting the same test case twice is minimal.
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Classical theory helps predict the probability of failure using the Laplace rule of
succession [31]. If one samples the input space which has an unknown number of failure
causing inputs and after running t tests on the software, if no faults are detected then the
probability of failure in a single run is given by
1
.
t+2

This indicates that failure probability is inversely proportional to the number of test cases
executed. This is intuitive as the greater the number of correctly executed test cases the
more is one’s confidence in the software being tested.
To establish a failure rate of less than 10-9 failures per hours we need to test the
program for 109 hours. The alternative solution is to make prior assumptions about the
quality of software [28][13][3][6]. Chapter 4 in the thesis deals with the Bayesian
framework for reliability assessment, which uses prior subjective beliefs to be
incorporated into the model.
It is not sufficient if one could predict the failure probability θ, of the program.
We must gain confidence that the predicted value of θ does in fact depict the realistic
estimate of θ .
Input domain models are plagued by the following shortcomings
•

large number of test cases

•

The assumption of a test oracle: oracles decide whether the result from a test
run is correct or incorrect unequivocally. Building test oracles is difficult. In
this thesis, we define premises on how to create a test oracle.

•

Reliability estimation depends upon the ability to closely approximate/predict
the operational profile of the field use.[41]
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Despite these potential problems, a strong theoretical background of sampling
theory is the basis for choosing the input domain approach to assessing DOLILU II.
There are several techniques suggested in literature for effective testing of the
software. They all address the method of test data selection. The most popularly known
are code coverage techniques (branch testing and path testing), specification based
strategies [16][21], data flow criteria [17][18], and the domain strategy [22]. All these
methods share a common characteristic: the program’s input domain is divided into
subsets called subdomains. One or more inputs from each of these subdomains are
selected as representatives of the subdomain. This approach is called partition-testing
[24].
Studies by Duran and Naftos[29] and Hamlet and Taylor[30] showed that there is
only a marginal difference in finding bugs between partition testing and random testing.
In the remaining part of the thesis, chapter 4 and 5, we shall discuss the
applicability of these methods for the assessment of DOLILU II system. We discuss the
relative merits and their problems in trying to assess the reliability of the trajectory
evaluation system.
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3.0

Chapter 3: Day of Launch I-Load Update System (DOLILU II)
The DOLILU II system for the Space Shuttle program has been developed for

the generation of launch trajectories and to allow modification of the shuttle’s first stage
guidance commands based on wind conditions (atmospheric conditions) measured hours
preceding the launch. The system consists of trajectory software required to generate
trajectories and verify guidance commands to recommend decisions on whether to fly or
not to fly. It is clear that DOLILU is a high consequence system i.e., there is very high
cost and a risk of life associated with the eventual occurrence of a failure.
The decision making process may me viewed as consisting of four independent
stages:
•

Tracking and Wind Profiling stage: forms the first stage in the process. This process
assimilates data the from the launch balloons (tracking system), uses interpolation and
extrapolation techniques for the generation of wind, temperature and pressure profiles
based on altitude and time (wind profiling). This is shown as Tracking and Generate
Wind Profile in figure 3.1.

•

Trajectory and Guidance Commands stage: there are two processes involved in this
stage. They are Day-of-launch Ascent Design System (DADS) and Space Vehicle
Dynamic Simulation (SVDS). DADS, generates the initialization loads (first stage
guidance commands) and the launch trajectories for the day-of-launch (DOL)
atmospheric conditions. SVDS generates a trajectory for mean monthly atmospheric
conditions surrounding DOL with DADS generated guidance commands for these
conditions and one for DOL conditions.
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Figure 3.1: Integrated Day-of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU II) System Diagram
•

Verification stage: this stage forms the penultimate stage in the decision process. This
process evaluates wind and trajectory conditions against the guidance commands to
ensure the launch would not be fatal. We call this stage the Trajectory Evaluation
Stage.

•

Experts Team: after the evaluation process is completed by DOLILU II system, a
team of experts analyze the results obtained from the system and finally decide
whether to make the flight or not.
In order to increase the reliability of the system, NASA adopted design diversity,

to make the system more fault tolerant. There are two separate computational lanes
indicated as primary and secondary systems in figure 3.1. Guidance commands and flight
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trajectories generated are deemed valid only if the outputs of both the lanes agree in their
analysis. In this thesis, we are interested in the assessment methodologies for the primary
system, especially the Trajectory Evaluation System.

3.1

DOLILU II – Primary System
The tracking systems receive the wind and atmospheric data from the balloons

released a few hours before the scheduled time of launch. The data is fed into the wind
profile generation processor. As the name suggests the primary function of this processor
is to generate the profiles in the required data format understandable to the remaining part
of the system.
The TLAMS (Trajectory and Load Analysis Management System, shown in the
diagram as the executive) initiates the next sequence of events for trajectory and guidance
commands generation and their validation. It invokes the Day-of-launch Ascent Design
System (DADS). DADS processor generates the guidance commands and simulates the
trajectories for the day of launch conditions. Guidance commands (I-Loads) and
measured winds are passed on to the Space Vehicle Dynamic Simulation (SVDS)
processor. SVDS produces two trajectory files, one is called the reference trajectory
(REFTRAJ), and this is simulated for mean monthly wind conditions. It also creates a
second trajectory file (DOLITRAJ) which uses the updated I-loads and present wind
conditions.
Near real-time verification is the most critical function of the DOLILU system.
Successfully simulated trajectories and their corresponding I-loads (guidance commands)
are verified for conformance with safety related rules, called envelopes. The envelopes
have been derived from previous experience (experience envelopes) and known system
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constraints (system envelopes). If any of the system constraint rules are violated then the
violation must be reported. A violation, when plotted, would be clearly seen to exceed the
system and experience envelopes. Such a flight trajectory is generally deemed invalid and
must be dismissed. TLAMS executive invokes the Day of launch I-Load Verification
Table (DIVDT) processor, which performs trajectory verification. DIVDT verifies
trajectories based on a predefined set of rules[40].
The DIVDT should detect all potentially unsafe flight conditions, verifying the outputs
from all the other processors of DOLILU system. Therefore, the reliability quantification
of the DIVDT processor is highly desirable.

3.2 Day-of-launch I-Load Verification Data Table (DIVDT)
DIVDT evaluates the trajectory conditions against the guidance commands (Iloads) that are generated. The process of evaluation is done based on rules defined in the
Quality Assurance Document [40]. Rules are classified as (in their increasing order of
importance)
•

System Constraint Rules (S-rules): Any violation is considered being a failure to
make the flight. These rules affect the integrity of the system.

•

Experience Constraint Rules (E-rules): Design engineers based on their experience
with the system determine these rules. They are similar to S-rules but provide some
more latitude in their evaluation. They help the experts’ team in their final decision
E.g. if the percentage of exceedance is not large for a given S-rule and is contained
well within limits of the corresponding E-rule then the team may pass the rule.
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•

Processor Rules (P-rules): these sets of rules are defined for the processor integrity.
They deal with the interfaces between the various processors. They check whether the
data is conveyed properly between the various processors.

•

Abort Region Determinator Rules: special rules that are defined for the safety of the
flight.
DIVDT has two modes of execution

•

Normal Mode

•

QA mode
In the normal mode, it verifies that I-Loads generated by DADS is acceptable for

flight by evaluating trajectory parameters in accordance with the DOLILU II Quality
Assurance Rules. [40] The QA mode provides rapid quality assurance of a trajectory
without a preceding DADS I-Loads generation. The trajectory is generated close to
launch using the latest day-of-launch (DOL) environment, generated at an earlier balloon
release time. All functions of the QA mode remain the same as normal mode except for
the following
•

Omission of the DADS-generated trajectory files

•

Omission of DIVDT “P” and “A” rules evaluation.

•

Omissions of outputs for “P” and “A” rules in the DIVDT output summary.1
DIVDT requires several inputs for it proper operation. They are as follows

I.

SVDS simulated trajectories
There are two trajectory files that are generated by SVDS

1

P = Processor rules, A = Abort Region Determinator Rules
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svds_15_ref: a reference trajectory, which could be any of the previously created
SVDS trajectory files. This helps in the definition of experience envelope. Typically
it contains mean monthly environments and pre-launch predicted mass properties.
The I-Loads used are DADS generated I-Loads designed for the launch month’s mean
environments.



svds_15: is SVDS trajectory file that is usually generated with the DADS updated ILoads and measured winds (normal mode).

II.


DADS generated trajectories and I-Loads
dads_15: is a trajectory that is internally created by DADS. This is required only in
the normal mode of execution.



dads_iloads: is required only in the normal mode of operation. Contains the DADS
generated I-Loads (guidance commands) and the ARD (abort region determination)
engine modeling data.



ard_divdt: is created by DADS and contains ARD parameters to be verified by
DIVDT. Required only in the normal mode.

III.


Limits input files
DIVDTINPUT: limits input file used to input the variable limit values for each rule
identified in [40].



VENTDATA: contains limit arrays for the venting carpet constraint.
During the entire execution of the program there is no user intervention. DIVDT

evaluates the rules and provides a summary of the results in ASCII (text summary files)
as well as binary data files (plot data files). The evaluation takes place in three stages,
first stage of flight, staging (this refers to pre-orbital insertion stage) and orbiting stage
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(MECO). Plot files created by DIVDT are passed to the DIVPLT program, which
generates plot outputs. The output files of DIVDT are described below
•

Divdt_control: file containing the flight number, atmosphere balloon release time,
wind balloon release time, and up to ten of the highest DIVDT rule violations.

•

Divdt_stdplt: a file containing plot data for all the rules.

•

Divdt_rsplot: containing plot data for Range Safety Rule, a system constraint rule.

•

Divdt_thrplt: containing plot data for Altitude Constraint Rule.

•

Divdt_trjsum: a file containing trajectory summary and evaluation of parameters at
critical points in the trajectory (i.e. first stage, staging, MECO).

•

Divdt_topten: a top-ten summary of the discrete rules with the highest percentage of
exceedance. A summary of the DOLILU I-Loads is also given.

•

Divdt_detail: a detailed summary of all the rules evaluated with their percentage of
exceedance and a verdict of PASS or FAIL for each rule.

•

Divdt_summary: a summary of the list of rules arranged in the descending order by
their percentage of exceedance.

Further information about the quality assurance rules and DIVDT functioning could be
obtained from the following documents [39][40].

3.3 Assessment Methodologies for DIVDT
As mentioned earlier, DOLILU II is a high consequence system. Prior to this
work there has been no attempt to determine the reliability assessment of the software.
Acceptance test cases identified in [43] represent the minimum testing required to
evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the software. Testing criteria specifically
addresses verification of logic paths, data handling, and design constraints that may be
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encountered during the normal operation of DIVDT. Tests are performed to verify
compliance with functional requirements. After system testing, one of the following
decisions must be made
•

Acceptance of software: following the designated testing period the formal software
configuration will be completed.

•

Conditional Acceptance of software: contains conditions that had errata in them. It
furnishes information of testing that needs to be done after the errors have been
corrected. It is observed that only the corrected regions of the software are re-tested,
but from our experience we know that changes made in the software could affect
other regions in the program. Hence we need to perform tests on the complete
software to ensure that the changes did not create new errors.

•

Rejection of software: this is accompanied by the details of the requirements that
were not met. Rejected software needs to be re-tested with all tests before formal
acceptance.
The test philosophy ensures that all the rules are being exercised. The tests were

designed for external interfaces, design, and program logic. Some of the techniques used
are enumerated in the following subsections.

3.3.1 Inspection
Inspection is a manual verification technique in which the program (code, data) is
examined to discover discrepancies with requirements. Code walk-through and code
inspections were some of the techniques adopted here.

25

3.3.2 Analysis
Analysis involved formal verification methods, to analyze the functions. As these
methods required rigorous mathematics, only a subset of the functions was analyzed this
way.

3.3.3 Testing
Testing is performed with a specified set of steps, which will result in some
expected results. The expected results are also documented along with the test results.

3.3.4 Demonstration
Typically this method is used to gain confidence that software will not abort
under certain conditions. Incorrect input file format or a missing file is typical conditions
that require demonstration

3.3.5 Comparison Against Results from Previous Version
Regression testing of the software is done to ensure that changes have not
adversely altered the function form the previous version. Identical data sets are used to
test both the versions and the results are compared.
Software testing is based on the criticality of the part during the evaluation
process. Tests were classified into 5 sections,


External interfaces: deal with the P-rules, external processors communicating with
DIVDT. They tested for conformance of data.



Internal interfaces: deals with testing DIVDT for correct rules evaluation. A
combination of the aforementioned techniques was adopted.



Limit testing: deals with limit based checking
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Top ten testing: manually manipulated trajectory data for a selected 10 rules and
checked for confirmation from the DIVDT output summary.



Worst Value testing.

Further description of strategies may be obtained from [43].
The techniques described were not used to assess the reliability of DOLILU II
system. They only stress tested the system for conformance with the specifications. This
gave us an opportunity to devise new techniques to assess the reliability of the software.

The next chapter deals with the Bayesian Inference Framework for reliability assessment.
In the framework we try to incorporate our belief in the system using the knowledge that
it has already been in use and tested. We do this by incorporating subjective probability
into our model.
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4.0

Chapter 4: Assessment Methodologies
Reliability assessment of systems must be based on precisely defined concepts in

order to make comparisons between systems possible and to provide a logical basis to
improve the system’s reliability [28].
In most life critical applications, one has to establish that software reliability is
indeed high. Butler and Finelli [51] classified software systems into three types namely,
•

Ultrahigh reliability:

< 10-7 failures/hour,

•

Moderate Reliability:

10-3 – 10-7 failures/hour,

•

Low Reliability:

> 10-3 failures/hour.

Unlike hardware, where reliability is associated with physical faults, software programs
have faults induced in them from the beginning (requirements documents) to through out
the life cycle. Nevertheless, when we view the system as an entity, subjecting it to inputs
and observing the outputs, the system either produces a correct or an incorrect result. This
may be viewed as a stochastic process, where the software produces errors in a stochastic
manner [51]. Based on this observation we may now define software reliability:
Software reliability is the probability of failure free executions of the
software, over a given period of time and within a specified environment.
Consider the following simplistic model for modeling software reliability. The software
is subjected to external inputs. The program is viewed as a black box function f that maps
the inputs to the corresponding points in the output domain. The same software is
repeatedly executed for each of these inputs. There exist only two possible outcomes,
either the software executes correctly and produces the right output, or the software
executes incorrectly and produces an incorrect result. If we assume a constant failure rate
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(per input), say θ, then testing can be modeled as a binomial process. The number of
failures F after n inputs is then given by
P( F = r )

=

n

C r θ r (1 − θ ) n − r

(4.1)

where r represents the total number of failures observed for n inputs. The term n C r is an
n
alternative form for representing combinations, computed as   .
r
We need to determine the probability of system failure for n inputs, failures can
occur for all F>0. Therefore, using (4.1),

P(n) = P( F > 0) = 1 − P( F = 0)
P(n) = 1 − (1 − θ ) n

(4.2)

With our assumption of constant failure rate over time, we may represent n in terms of
time; n = kt where k = number of inputs/unit time then

P(t) = 1− (1−θ )kt

(4.3)

With kt being large in comparison with θ, (1-θ)kt may be approximated as e-θkt. This is
obtained from the Poisson approximation to binomial discrete distribution. Hence some
researchers assume that the time to failure distribution is exponential.
Traditionally, the method of software creation involves a cycle, where the
software is created, then sufficiently tested. When an error is found, the bug is fixed and
the software is tested again. This forms the basis for “Reliability growth models” (RGM).
The goal for these models is to fit mathematical models to predict what would be the
estimated reliability of the final version of the software, based on inter-failure time
observation. There are numerous RGMs, the reader may refer to [6] for a concise
description of these.
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There are several problems in potentially applying reliability growth models for
assessment of DIVDT (DOLILU II). When considering reliability growth models, the
mean time to failure increases, (shown to exponential by Musa's model, others used loglinear distribution [51]) and consequently the failure probability decreases as more and
more bugs are fixed. However, what should be an acceptable time frame before the model
can achieve ultrahigh reliability? Miller and Keiller [52] stated that the time frame would
be prohibitively large. Another problem is when the software itself doesn’t exhibit any
failures. This is typical of safety-critical software. How could one fit a distribution with
no observed failures during acceptance testing? We require a model that overcomes these
difficulties.

4.1

Bayesian Inference Framework
Rev. Thomas Bayes’ paper first published in 1763 provides the basis for

“Bayesian Statistical Inference”. Due to its fundamental importance, the paper was republished in 1958 [28,45]. Several factors have contributed towards the recent resurgence
and wide scale acceptance of the theory.
The cornerstone of Bayesian inference is the notion of subjective probability.
Such a notion contrasts with the well-perceived notion of frequency for probability
estimation. The axiom of probability states that the probability of an event has to be
estimated by determining the value of success ratio. To progress towards this empirical
estimation, one has to conduct trials repeatedly, in which the event occurs.
Subjective probability deals not only with the events but with propositions as
well. A proposition is considered as a collection of events that contribute towards the
estimation based on previous events, observed behavior or the reflection of one’s belief in
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the system. In statistical terms, we hypothesize that the event does occur with the
estimated probability. As evidence increases relevant to the hypothesis, we then change
our degree of belief in the hypothesis.

Interestingly, some argue that subjective

probabilities assigned to a particular hypothesis may indeed be quite individualistic [28].
In other words, the probabilities assigned by different individuals would reflect different
beliefs yielding different results. Bayesian inference theory circumvents this in the
posterior analysis where our degree of belief changes with the observations made.
However, egregious probability assumptions are definitely not permissible.
4.1.1

Classical Probability Theory versus Bayesian Inference
There are distinctive differences between the classical theory and Bayesian

methods of inference. In classical theory approach, the unknown parameter to be
estimated (θ ) is assumed to be a fixed constant. A point estimator, which is a function of
the data set (observed) is chosen according to some principle such as minimum variance,
least squares or the method of moments. Classical theory inferences are then made using
inductive reasoning. The Classical method of inference is depicted in Figure 4.1. The
process begins with the postulating of a sampling model. Inductive reasoning is used in
conjunction with the sample observations to produce inferences about the unknown
parameters.
Assumptive
Sampling Model

Sample Data

Inductive
Reasoning

Statistical Inferences

Figure 4.1: Classical Model for Inferences
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Bayesian method of reasoning is deductive. The parameter of interest (θ ) is
assumed to be a random variable with a priori distribution g(θ). This distribution
expresses the assessor’s state of knowledge or ignorance about θ before the sample data,
say y, is analyzed. Given the prior distribution, and the data set y, Bayes’ theorem is used
to calculate the posterior distribution g(θ|y).
The prior distribution in a Bayesian analysis usually embodies a subjective notion
of probability. It is the distribution of degree of belief about θ before the observational
data (y) is obtained. A distinctive feature of Bayesian inference is that it takes explicit
account of prior information in the analysis. This contrasts with the classical approach of
sampling theory. Figure 4.2 depicts the Bayesian method of inference. The process
begins with a postulated sampling model. A prior probability distribution is also assumed.
The sample data and the prior distribution are combined by the use of Bayes’ theorem
(explained in section 4.1.3). Deductive reasoning is then used in conjunction with the
resulting posterior distribution to produce the desired inferences about the parameters of
the assumed sampling model.
There are two further distinctive differences between sampling theory and
Bayesian procedures. Bayes’ use of relevant past experience, which is quantified by the
Assumptive
Sampling Model

Sample data
Bayes
Theorem

Deductive
Reasoning

Assumptive
Prior Model

Figure 4.2: Bayesian Inference Model
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Statistical
Inferences

prior distribution, produces inferences that are more informative. The second distinction
is that the Bayesian method usually requires less sample data to achieve the same quality
of inferences than methods based on sampling theory.
4.1.2 Advantages of Bayesian Inference in Software Reliability
Software reliability estimation methods based on sampling theory have been
found useful for a variety of problems. There are, however, many instances in which the
classical methods have been found to be less than satisfactory. There has been an everincreasing demand for cost-effectiveness in reliability assessments of systems, typically
safety critical systems. Sampling methods for software reliability estimation cause
problems when based on scarce failure data. When observing the failure rates of software
for commercial nuclear power plants [28], it was observed that the mean time to failures
is t = 7.9 x 106 h. As a consequence it is not possible to determine a two-sided
confidence interval estimate on a constant failure rate, assuming an exponential failure
time model. The point estimate would be zero, an overly optimistic estimate.
As another example, consider estimating the failure rate based on sample data
consisting of zero observed failures in many reactor years of commercial operation. We
are faced with the same situation as in our preceding example. These examples are
reflective of problems in estimating the reliability of DIVDT (DOLILU II) software since
no failures have been observed during test executions. We do know that the software has
been successfully operating over the past five years. How does one incorporate this
information into the estimation model? In situations like these, the methods based on
sampling theory are frequently replaced in favor of more useful methods, like the
Bayesian approach.
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As mentioned earlier there are two important practical benefits in using Bayesian
analysis. One is the increased quality of inferences, provided the prior information
incorporated in the model reflects the true variation in the parameter(s). The other is the
reduction in testing requirements. There is yet another advantage. Inferences that are
inaccurate arise from incorrect assumptions and not from inadequacies of the method
used to provide them.
Bayesian methods provide a satisfactory way of explicitly introducing and
organizing assumptions regarding prior knowledge or ignorance. These assumptions lead,
via Bayes’ theorem, to posterior inferences about the reliability of parameter(s) of
interest.
4.1.3

Bayes’ Theorem with Subjective Probabilities
Bayes’ theorem is the fundamental tool used to arrive at Bayesian inferences. Let

θ denote the parameter of interest that we would like to estimate. The prior model
represents the subjective information available about θ before the observation of the
sample data x.
x =obsevations on the sample data.
g (θ )=the prior probability distribution.
f ( x | θ )=the conditional probability distrbution of x given θ .
g (θ | x)=the posterior distribution of θ given x.

The posterior model tells us what is known about θ given the knowledge of the data x. It
is intuitive that the posterior model should represent an updated version of our prior
knowledge of θ. If the data supports our belief, there should be an increased confidence
in the subjective notions. On the other hand if the sample data does not support the
subjective information, the posterior model should give a weighted consideration of both

34

assessments, the sample data and prior. This is achieved by using Bayes’ theorem. The
posterior distribution is given by

g (θ | x ) =

f ( x| θ ) g (θ )
,
f (x)

where f(x) represents the marginal distribution and may be obtained by

f (x) =

4.2

∫

f ( x| θ ) g (θ ) dθ .

Bayesian Reliability Assessment of DIVDT (DOLILU II)
The primary reason in adopting the Bayesian approach is to incorporate in our

reliability assessment model the knowledge that the system has already been in use and,
prior to that, rigorously tested. Furthermore, the techniques adopted for the creation of the
software shows that the system was indeed developed using proper software engineering
practices.
4.2.1 Choice of Prior Distribution
There are several papers in literature [13,46] and books [28,47] that have provided
guidelines in choosing a proper prior distribution. For our framework, we chose beta
distribution to accurately reflect prior beliefs. There are two primary reasons in choosing
this distribution.
i. By proper choice of the parameters, it is possible to depict any type of distribution
that is actually exhibited by the system.
ii. The distribution forms a conjugate family. The conjugate family has the property
that both the prior and posterior distributions will be members of the same
parametric family of distributions [46,47]. Intuitively this represents a kind of
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homogeneity in the way in which our beliefs are represented, and how they change
as we receive extra information [13].
The intention here is to devise a framework that attests that if the system executes

n demands without failure then it is deemed to have achieved the required confidence in
reliability estimate. Within the Bayesian framework we represent our prior knowledge
about the parameter of interest, here the probability of failure on demand denoted as θ, by
the prior distribution. The prior distribution from the conjugate family is the beta
distribution

θ p −1 (1 − θ ) q −1
f (θ ) =
B ( p, q )

(4.4)

where B(p,q) is the beta function with p>0, q>0, p and q represent our prior belief in θ
for the software under test. Assuming ignorance prior implies that it is equally likely to
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Figure 4.3: Graph for beta(p,q) with p=q=1, equally likely distribution

have any value of θ in the range 0-1. If we set the values of p and q as p=q=1 and
substitute in equation (1) we obtain a f(θ) = 1, rectangular probability distribution as
in Figure 4.3.
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The goal of reliability assessment is not just to estimate the failure probability but
to gain statistical confidence that the estimate is indeed realistic. In practice the required
failure rate θ and the confidence level C are usually predefined. The question is how
much testing needs to be done?
Let T be a random variable denoting the total number of test cases that need to be
executed until the first failure is detected. To achieve a required confidence, an unknown
number of test cases U needs to be executed such that
Pr ob(T ≤ U ) = C.

(4.5)

Considering the classical sampling theory for estimating, the distribution of T is assumed
geometric and the probability that T assumes a particular value t is given by

Pr ob(T = t ) = θ (1 − θ ) t −1 .

(4.6)

Combining equation (4.5) and (4.6), we get the equation relating U and C.
U

Pr ob(T ≤ U ) = ∑ θ (1 − θ ) t −1 .

(4.7)

t =1

U

∑θ (1 − θ )

t −1

= C.

(4.8)

t =1

The left-hand side of the equation (4.8) is a geometric series and can be computed as
U −1
 1 − (1 − θ ) U
θ ∑ (1 − θ ) t = θ 
t =0
 1 − (1 − θ )


.


(4.9)

Substituting (4.9) in (4.8) we get

(1 − (1 − θ ) U ) = C

(4.10)

Solving equation (4.10) for U we get

(1 − θ )U = 1 − C .
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(4.11)

Taking loge on both sides, the required number of test cases U, is therefore

U =

ln(1 − C )
.
ln( 1 − θ )

(4.12)

In the Bayesian framework of assessment if the system has executed n demands and we
have seen r failures, we get posterior distribution of f(θ) to be [46,47].
f (θ | n, r , p, q ) =

θ p + r −1 (1 − θ ) q + n − r −1
.
B( p + r , q + n − r )

(4.13)

Assuming ignorance prior, we get p=q=1, therefore

θ r (1 − θ ) n − r
f (θ | n, r ,11
,) =
.
B(1 + r ,1 + n − r )

(4.14)

If we require U demands before detecting the first failure then n=U, r=0, therefore
f (θ | U ,0,11
,) =

(1 − θ ) U
B(11
, + U)

(4.15)

B(1,1+U) is the complete beta function. The generalized form is
1

B(a, b) = ∫ θ a −1 (1 − θ ) b −1

(4.16)

0

Therefore B(1,1+U) is given by
1

B(11
, + U) =

∫ (1 − θ )

U

dθ =

0

1
1+U

(4.17)

It is required that the failure rate θ should be less than the pre-mediated value p0 with
confidence level C. Now Prob(θ<p0) is the cumulative density function given by
p0

Pr ob(θ ≤ p 0 ) =

∫

f (θ | U ,0,1,1) dθ .

0

Mathematically we represent the above statement as
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(4.18)

Pr ob(θ ≤ p 0 ) ≥ C .

(4.19)

Substituting equation (4.17) in (4.18) we get
p0

∫

f (θ | U ,0,1,1) ≥ C .

(4.20)

o

Substituting for f(θ|U,0,1,1) from equation (4.14) we get
p0

∫
0

(1 − θ ) U
dθ ≥ C .
B(1,1 + U )

(4.21)

Combining equations (4.20) and (4.16) and integrating we get
p0

∫ (1 + U )(1 − θ )

U

dθ = C .

(4.22)

0

The solution for the above equation yields the result in the following form
p0

 (1 − θ ) 1+U 
(1 + U ) 
 = C.
 (1 + U )( −1)  0

(4.23)

Simplifying equation (4.22) we get
1 − (1 − p 0 )1+U = C .

(4.24)

Taking loge on both sides and solving equation (4.23) for U, we get the total number of
test cases required to achieve with defined confidence C that the reliability requirement
p0 is satisfied as
U=

ln(1 − C )
−1.
ln(1 − p 0 )

(4.25)

Comparing equation (4.24) and (4.12) we realize that they are the same. It is clear that
since p=q=1 provide no knowledge, they do not influence the interpretation of the test
results. Hence, both Classical and Bayesian theory require almost the same number of
cases in the absence of prior knowledge of failure distribution.
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Now we shall introduce our prior belief into the framework. Before we do this we
need to justify our claim in the prior distribution. Two main reasons encourage our belief


The software has been in use for the past couple of years. As already discussed in
chapter 3, several methodologies, partial correctness proofs, inspection, code walkthrough were already adopted in testing the software piecewise. However we would
like to reiterate that there has been no attempt in assessing the reliability of the
software.



A rigorous development process was adopted and two different versions of the
software were developed for added redundancy adding to the fault tolerance of the
system.
Considering the above factors, especially the fact that the software has been

operational failure free for more than five years, rigorously tested and stringently
developed, we could safely assume that the software at least exhibited a failure
probability of 10-3 failures/h. According to [13,28,47] we could assign the values to p
and q to reflect this belief. We get p=8 and q=9850 (see Appendix B Table B.1) Now our
complete beta function is (taking a=p and b=q+U)
1

B( p , q + U ) =

∫θ

p −1

(1 − θ ) q + U − 1

(4.26)

0

Repeated integration by parts and simplification yields (see Appendix B Solve B.1)
B( p , q + U ) =

( p − 1) !
( q + U )( q + U + 1). . . . ( q + U + p − 1)

(4.27)

Taking n=U, r=0 (no failures observed), equation (4.12) reduces to

θ p −1 (1 − θ ) q +U −1
f (θ | U ,0, p, q ) =
.
B ( p, q + U )
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(4.28)

In equation (4.18) we substitute (4.27), we get
p0

∫

f (θ | U ,0, p, q ) ≥ C

(4.29)

0

( q + U )( q + U + 1). . . . . ( q + U + p − 1)
( p − 1) !

p0

∫θ

p−1

(1 − θ ) q + U −1 dθ = C

(4.30)

o

Integrating equation (4.27) by parts and simplifying we get
(q + U + p − 1)(q + U + p − 2)....(q + U + 1) p −1
( q + U + p − 1).....(q + U + 2) p −1
θ (1 − θ ) q +U −
θ (1 − θ ) q +U +1 −
( p − 1)!
( p − 2)!
( q + U + p − 1)(q + U + p − 2)...(q + U + 3) p − 3
(q + U + p − 1)(q + U + p − 2)..(q + U + 4) p − 4
θ (1 − θ ) q +U + 2 −
θ (1 − θ ) q +U + 3 − ....... = C
( p − 4)!
( p − 3)!

1−

We used MathCAD to solve equation (4.28). We substituted the values for p0 = 10-3, 104

...10-7 with C = 0.99. Numerical solutions obtained for the above equation is given in

table 4.2.
A comparison between the total number of test cases required by random
sampling and the equivalent number of test cases required using the Bayesian framework
is shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2 and figure 4.7 and 4.8
Table 4.1: Number of test cases from Random Sampling (C=0.99)
Random Sampling
Values of θ

10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7

Number of test cases

4,604
46,052
460,516
4,605,168
46,051,700

Table 4.2: Number of Test Cases using Bayesian Framework (C=0.99),
assuming θ=10-5
Bayesian Method
Values of θ

Number of test cases

10
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7

950
22,052
260,780
4,295,000
41,541,171

-3
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In [13] Bev Littlewood states that in order to assess the reliability in a Bayesian
Framework, we first need to believe that the system indeed exhibits the proposed failure
rate before testing. The posterior analysis would then endorse this belief in our system
from the testing results.
Table 4.3: Number of Test Cases using Bayesian Framework (C=0.99)
Bayesian Method
Values of θ

Number of test cases

10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7

950
2678
9436
20796
51987

When testing reveals failures it translates into our posterior model by decreasing
our belief that the probability of failure has been achieved. Consider equation 4.14, when
testing reveals failures, the value of r in the equation increases. This decreases the power
for the factor (1-θ) and increases the power for the factor θ . This shows that the new
distribution now decreases our initial belief. If no errors were detected, then the
distribution changes with an increase our original belief (as the power of (1-θ) now
increases).
In table 4.3, we compute the total number of test cases required before the first
failure occurs to ensure with a confidence of 0.99 (having a prior belief obtained from
Table B.2 in Appendix B for each θ ) that the software did indeed exhibit the proposed
failure probability.
It is clear from the tables, that in order to obtain a reasonable time frame to test a
system, we need to believe that the system did indeed achieve the proposed degree of
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failure rate before testing. The purpose for testing is to endorse this belief. If the system
did not achieve the proposed reliability, then this is reflected in our posterior analysis.
The cornerstone for Bayesian Inference is the subjective knowledge of the system
that is incorporated into the assessment model. One has to understand how one might
provide values for the priors p and q.
Consider Table B.3 is Appendix B. This shows the variation in the number of test
cases when we try to decrease the amount of variation in our prior model. As one
traverses the table downwards, this is indicative of decreased variance in our prediction
and the consequent increase in the number of test cases.
Hence, if we need a greater degree of confidence in our prior beliefs itself we
need to execute more number of test cases.
4.2.2 Extended testing with occurrence of failure

The above subsection predicts the total number of test cases that needs to be
executed correctly before we deem that the software has indeed achieved the required
failure probability at the required confidence. How should one proceed in the eventuality
of a failure? When using the Bayesian Framework in reliability assessment, we could use
the information that testing has yielded until the first failure was observed [46]. To
predict how many future test cases need to be done after the failure has been revealed we
could use the posterior distribution obtained until the first failure occurred. Let us assume
that a failure occurred after the execution of s demands (s < n the estimated number of
demands). The posterior for θ immediately following the failure on the sth demand
f (θ | s,1, p, q ) =

θ p (1 − θ ) s − 2
B ( p + 1, s + q − 1)
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(4.31)

This forms the prior distribution for θ for further testing that needs to be conducted. We
now need to compute U1 the total number of failure-free executions required for the
software to exhibit the required probability density function; this is

θ p (1 − θ ) U + s + q − 2
f (θ | U 1 + s,1, p, q ) =
B( p + 1, U 1 + s + q − 1)
1

(4.32)

Notice that this is simply the posterior distribution after seeing both (s-1) failure free
executions followed by a failure, and then seeing U1 further failure free demands. This
posterior distribution will be the same whenever the single failure occurred among s+U1
demands: it depends only upon the total number of demands, and the number of failures.
Now we may compute U1 for which
p0

∫
0

θ p (1 − θ ) U + s + q − 2
≥C
B( p + 1, U 1 + s + q − 1)
1

(4.33)

In general, if we have seen in the rth failure and the failures occurred on the s1th, (s1+s2)th,
…….,(s1+s2+s3+…..+sr)th demands we should require an additional Ur demands
executed failure-free, such that
r

p0

∫
0

θ

p+r

(1 − θ )

B( p + r , U 1 +

∑ sa +U1 + q − r
0

≥ C

r

∑s

a

(4.34)

+ q − r)

0

Having developed a framework to assess DIVDT (DOLILU II), we need to address two
important issues when estimating software. How does one accelerate the execution of
software in order to achieve an agreeable period for testing the software? How does one
generate the input conditions to test the system?
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5.0

Chapter 5.0: Acceleration of Test Cases
After establishing a framework for reliability assessment of DIVDT (DOLILU II)

using Bayesian inference, we were faced with another unique problem that required
immediate attention. The time taken for the execution of each test run of the software is
too long given the amount of testing required. Typically DIVDT (DOLILU II) takes on
an average (assuming a normal mode of execution for Day of Launch I-Load Verification
Data Table (DIVDT)) 20 to 25 minutes [43] for a single run. Despite the reduction in the
number of test cases, around 200000 test case executions still need to be performed. This
would amount to around 9-10 years of execution time to certify with 99% confidence that
DIVDT (DOLILU II) indeed achieved ultrahigh reliability!! Consequently we required a
reduction in the time for each test case execution.

5.1

Transformations for Accelerated Execution of Test Cases
Program transformations have been used for code modifications especially in

code optimizations in order to enhance certain desirable properties such as performance
or portability. The application of a transformation to a given program is a three-step
process:


Decision: which part of the program do we apply the transformation and what type of
transformation are we going to use.



Verification: ensure that the transformation doesn’t change the meaning (semantics)
of the program or if it changes it is done in a restricted manner that is acceptable.



Actual transformation of the program.
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Transformations can be effective only if it is possible to discern whether there are
benefits in their application.

We expect benefits in the speed of execution of the

program.
Semantically equivalent transformations preserve the exact meaning of the
program under transformation. In other words, the transformed program does operations
in exactly the same sequence as the original program. It is important to note and quoted
from [50], that, “semantic transformation is the property of the program execution and
not the program”. By that, we mean, if the transformed program executes correctly for
some input we can conclude the original program also executes correctly. If the
transformed program executes incorrectly for some other input, we can justifiably claim
the same for the original program.
The above transformations are based on source code. One may even speed up
testing by changing other parameters of influence. E.g. environment conditions can be
changed, like using a faster processor, or opting for centralized parallel processing to
distributed computing. These types of transformations are termed configuration
transformations.
In this thesis, whenever we refer to a transformed program, it may either refer to a
source-to-source transformation with unchanged environment conditions, or only
configuration transformations or a combination of both.

5.2

Source Transformations
Source-to-source transformations are based on making changes to the software to

increase the speed of operation of the program. We shall now discuss the different
techniques that we tried to adopt to decrease the execution time of the software.
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5.2.1 Vertical Slicing

Process control programs are usually very large complex programs constructed by
composing smaller components like procedures; user defined data types and others. They
usually compute several output parameters. When developers/users attempt to understand
and manipulate programs, they achieve this by decomposing the program. This general
observation led to the concept of program slices first introduced by Weiser [48]. It is a
straightforward method of decomposing a program into different data flow blocks, by
analyzing control and data flow. The original algorithm generated static program slices
from data flow graphs. A static program slice extracted all the statements that affect a
variable or a subset of variables in the program. A static slice groups statements that
directly or indirectly affect the value of a given output variable or output variables. The
program slice constitutes a separately executable program, which preserves a specified
projection of the original program’s behavior, viz., it computes a subset of the original
program’s output variables. This form of slicing is referred to as “vertical slicing” as it
decomposes programs into data blocks in the direction of data flow and control [6][50].
The interesting feature of this slicing technique is that, each program slice is
capable of executing and reproducing the exact behavior of the original program within
the specified sub-domain in which the slice is defined.
From the point of view of speed-up gain we have three major consequences by
using the slicing technique


Potential reductions in the number of program statements in each individual slice,
leading to smaller, faster executable programs.
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Each slice is independently executable and consequently this makes parallel
execution of all the slices feasible. Furthermore, when run concurrently the union of
the outputs of the all slices forms the output of the original program.



Consider when some of the vertical slices could be formally verified. The execution
of these is deemed unnecessary. Hence, we could reduce the number of vertical slices
that needs to be executed.

5.2.2

Reducing numerical precision

This monotonic transformation technique is based on the fact that, double
precision arithmetic is more CPU intensive than single precision arithmetic [50]. The
same applies between single precision and integer computations.
When programs are decomposed using vertical slicing, each slice can be further
transformed to hasten the computation process. We can transform all double declarations
to floats. This transformation is applicable only if the slice itself isn’t computationally
sensitive. The definition of slice functions that are not sensitive to computational
precision is borrowed from [50].
A program function slice is not sensitive to computational precision if and
only if small fluctuations of the input variables produce a small fluctuation
in the output variables.
During the execution of the program slice, if a disparity occurs, the original slice
is run to compare whether a fault did occur or not. Program slices with sensitive slice
functions are tested with the original slices.
When it is known that there is a requirement for only a fixed number of
significant digits, we may manipulate the calculations to be integer computations. We
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replace the decimal computations with integer computations by multiplying by a factor of
10n. After the computations are done, we can determine the final value by dividing the
final result by 10n. However fractional computations may lead to erroneous results.

5.3

Environment Changes
Changing environment conditions in which the program is being tested can

further accelerate testing. One method would be by running on a faster processor. It is
important to note that the processors used should be “binary compatible” (representation
of data types and executables should be alike).

5.4

Transformations applied for DIVDT (DOLILU II)
We shall now apply the aforementioned methods to decrease the total execution

time of DIVDT.
5.4.1

Applying Vertical Slicing to DIVDT (DOLILU II)

DIVDT evaluates trajectory conditions with the generated I-Loads (initial
guidance commands) based on pre-defined rules [40]. When decomposing the software, it
became apparent that we should make the decomposition rules based. This is further
reassured when one observes output from DIVDT. Every rule is evaluated based on
trajectory parameters and a verdict is given as a PASS or FAIL for each rule. A list of all
the rules evaluated as adapted from [40][43][42] is given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: DOLILU II Quality Assurance Rules
Rule No Title

E6

S1

E7

S2

Pitch and Yaw I-Load within
SAIL Envelope
Staging Dynamic Pressure

E8

S3
S4

Staging Angle of Attack
Staging Angle of Sideslip

E9
E10
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Roll, Pitch and Yaw Actual
Accelerations
Roll, Pitch and Yaw Actual Body
Rates
SSME Pitch and Yaw Gimbal
Commands
SRB Rock and Tilt Gimbal Cmds
Pitch and Yaw I-Loads Within

S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
S16
S17
S18
S19
S20
S21
S22
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5

Staging Roll, Yaw and Pitch Rates
SRB Apogee Constraint
Elevon Hinge Moment System
Venting Carpet Constraint
Heating Carpet Constraint
(deleted)
(deleted)
(deleted)
Throttle-Altitude Constraint
Range Safety
Margin
Roll, Pitch and Yaw Actual Body
Rates (Post SAR)
(deleted)
Flight Control System
DADS Wind I-Loads Within SAIL
Envelope
TREF Within SAIL Envelopes
Throttle I-Loads within SAIL and
Certification Envelopes
AGT Occurrence

E11
E12
E13
E14
E15

Parameter Experience
Elevon Hinge Moment Experience
(deleted)
(deleted)
Staging Velocity
Altitude Rate at SRB Separation

P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6

(deleted)
(deleted)
(deleted)
(deleted)
(deleted)
(deleted)

P7
P8
P9

(deleted)
DADS Convergence Check
(deleted)

P10
P11

SVDS/DADS I-Loads Comparison
I-Loads File Validation

P12

SVDS/DADS Weights @ 150
Seconds Comparison

Staging Gamma
Staging Altitude
A1
Staging Azimuth
A2
Roll, Pitch and Yaw Guidance Altitude
Errors
Roll, Pitch and Yaw Commanded
Body Rates

ARD DELT
ARD AGT

Before we proceed to apply vertical slicing techniques for speed enhancement, we
shall define a few terms that would aid in our explanation of the data flow proofs
provided in Appendix A. A program slice is defined as a set of all program statements for
a relevant computation. A slicing criterion specifies the slice (computation) for a variable,
v, at statement n. Program slices for a given criterion are obtained by deleting zero or
more statements from the given program P but still computing the same value for v at
statement n.
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An important pre-condition for applying vertical slicing is to provide data flow proofs for
each slice establishing complete independence and semantic integrity of each individual
slice. Data-flow proofs are given for each rule in Appendix A.
There is a great degree of redundancy in all the vertical slices. This is because
even before the execution of rules for evaluation one does checks for input parameter
consistency and a variety of checks for correct formats.
Having established the independence of all the slices our model of execution is as
shown in figure 5.1. We need to replicate the data across all the processes. Certain
processes like evaluation of P8, P9, P11 may be eliminated as they only check for
convergence checks. These can be formally verified.

Rule
S1

Rule
S2

Rule
E1

Rule
P2

Rule
P13

Figure 5.1: Parallel Execution of DIVDT
5.4.2

Applying Numerical Precision Reduction for DIVDT

After consulting with NASA personnel and as documented in [43] for testing
purposes it was sufficient if the precision was considered upto 5 significant digits. We
transformed all double declarations to floats. As mentioned earlier this method is
applicable for slices that are not sensitive computationally. As most of the rules evaluated
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are based on flow dynamics small changes in the input does not produce large changes in
the outputs.
As the number of significant digits were fixed we could use the transformation to
integer computations by multiplication by 10n and division later by 10n. This could
further help the computation process.
5.4.3

Environment Changes

Now that the possibility of parallel execution has been established, we could opt
for distributed computing or parallel machine. When changing environments we need to
ensure binary compatibility. Hence we need to choose binary compatible computers
during distributed computing. Hence we could chose a parallel machines as this reduces
latency delays in networks and all the processors are binary compatible.
In the next chapter we shall discuss the generation of input conditions for
automated testing of DIVDT.
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6.0

Chapter 6: Automated Test Case Generation
Several papers have been published on automated test case generation for testing

software. They are usually based on criteria like specifications [16] or data flow graphs
[17][18]. Data flow methods usually give a comprehensive logical path coverage.
In this thesis we develop an automated test strategy for testing the Trajectory
Evaluation Stage (DIVDT) of DOLILU II system. DIVDT does the evaluation by
exercising one function per rule to determine if the input files are indeed valid flight
trajectories. Conceptually, there are only two types of execution:


Either an incorrect data in any of the input files terminates the evaluation process and
DIVDT displays an appropriate message, or



The evaluation of all the rules is successfully completed.
To automate generation of test cases, we need to generate input conditions. Even

though our primary aim was to test DIVDT, we could not simulate the required trajectory
files generated by DADS and SVDS (If we could simulate it then we could replace the
functionality of DADS and SVDS!!). Hence we needed to generate inputs to the system,
namely atmospheric conditions.

6.1

Basic Philosophy
The idea behind this methodology is simple. We first analyze the data (the

observations) and then attempt to fit models to predict/interpolate data. In order to
achieve this we needed to first establish interactions between the factors that comprise the
system. We chose one of the factors to be the independent variable and determine others
based on changes to this variable.
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The algorithm is as follows


Assimilate data



By the rule of the thumb, chose 80% of the data to fit the model and the remaining
20% to evaluate the model.



Determine first, the possibility of liner relationships between factors, considering two
factors at a time and then three (line on plane).



Remove any outliers that might exist. These produce erroneous models.



Fit models, first starting with linear models. We should get a fairly good idea in
previously mentioned step about linearity between factors.



Determine goodness fit for the model chosen



Fit “mutators”; mutators change the independent variable and then predict other
values based on this change to simulate a new input suite.
In our model we have four factors of interest, namely, pressure, temperature, wind

and direction of wind. We chose pressure as the independent variable as it had a near
linear relationship with altitude for the first 2km of the atmosphere and later on a near
exponential curve. We then establish the models to predict temperature and wind speeds
based on changes in pressure.

6.2

Regression Models, Surface Models Analysis
We applied regression methods for establishing predictor functions between the

various factors. In this section we will introduce regression models that we analyzed and
applied to automate generation of test cases. We first analyze linear models, both one
factor and multiple factor parameters and then address models that fit polynomial curves,
and log linear curves for the data.
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6.2.1 Linear Regression models
Regression is a statistical methodology that determines the relationship between
two or more factors and utilizes it to predict one from the others. When we address
relationships there are two types that generally come to mind: a pure functional
relationship and statistical relationship. The two differ in their models and predictions.
Functional relationships define precise mathematical formulae between two or more
factors. The observations for functional relationship all fall on the curve. Statistical
models on the other hand are not perfect. Statistical models determine best-fit curves for
the data observed and hence observations do not fall directly on the curve. This is made
clear from graphs given below. Figure 6.1 shows a perfect linear fit depicting functional

Functional Relationship
350
300
250
200

Y

f(y) = 1.5x

150
100
50
0
0

50

100

150

200

250

X

Figure 6.1: Functional Relationship f(y) = 1.5x

relationship that exists. Consider the statistical model fit in the graph shown in Figure
6.2. It is clear that the fit model is not linear. However regression models are statistical
guesses as to the best-fit possible for the given data. Clearly, a linear fit does not
accommodate the data given. Further on in this chapter we shall discuss transformation
techniques to rectify this situation and explain the goodness-fit for the given regression
model.
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Regression Plot
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Figure 6.2: Regression Plot f(y) = 0.1342x + 20.84

The linear regression model is given by
yi = β1 xi + β 2

(6.1)

The parameters β1 and β2 are called the regression coefficients. β1 is the slope of the
regression line. It indicates the change in the mean of the probability distribution of y per
Y values

εi
100
60

E[y] = 2.1x
0

25

45

X values

Figure 6.3: Simple Linear Regression Model

unit increase in x. β2 is the y-intercept of the regression line. We know that regression
models do have errors in their prediction. Errors are assumed normally distributed around
the predicted point. The bell shaped curves at every value of y show this in the diagram.
The mean value of this distribution (the expected value) is our predicted value. Hence, we
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talk about the “mean probability distribution” of y. The equation of a linear model with
errors is
yi = β1 xi + β 2 + ε i

…(6.2)

The alternative model is to use the predictor variable deviation X i − X rather than Xi. To
leave the model unchanged we alter equation (6.2) as follows
yi = β1 ( xi − xmean ) + β1 xmean + β 2 + ε i

…(6.3)

yi = β1 ( xi − xmean ) + β 0* + ε i

…(6.4)

This can be reduced to

where β0* = β1xmean + β2.

6.2.2 Estimation of the Regression Model
The observational data used for predicting the parameters in a regression function
consists of observations on the predictor variable X and the corresponding observations of
the response variable Y. In general, we group each trial as a pair (Xi , Yi), where i denotes
the trial number. There are two main methods for estimation


Method of Least Squares.



Method of Maximum Likelihood.

6.2.2.1

Method of Least Squares

To find “good” estimates for β1 and β2, we employ the method of least squares.
Method of least squares is based on minimizing the error between the estimated value for
the response variable and the actual value for the response variable. In essence, method of
least squares requires that the sum of squared deviation be minimum. The criterion may
be mathematically formulated as

57

n

Minimize Q = ∑ [( yi − ( β1 xi + β 2 )]2

…(6.5)

i =1

We need to determine the values of β1 and β2 for which the fitted regression
model would have minimum errors in the estimates. We determine the values β1=b1 and
β2 = b2 for which the criterion is satisfied. The values are derived by partially
differentiating equation (6.5) with respect to β1 and β2, we get

and

n
∂Q
= − 2∑ ( yi − β1 xi − β 2 ) xi
∂β1
i =1

(6.6)

n
∂Q
= − 2∑ ( yi − β1 xi − β 2 )
∂β 2
i =1

(6.7)

Equating equations (6.6) and (6.7) to zero for minimization we get
n

∑(y
i =1

i

n

∑(y

and

i =1

i

− β1 xi − β 2 ) xi = 0

(6.8)

− β1 xi − β 2 ) = 0

(6.9)

Solving the two above equation we get
n

b1 =

∑ ( x − x )( y
i

i

− y)

1

(6.10)

n

∑ (x − x)

2

i

1

and

6.2.2.2

b2 =

n
1 n

 ∑ yi − b1 ∑ xi  = y − b1 x
n 1
1


(6.11)

Method of Maximum Likelihood
No matter what may be the form of the distribution of the error terms εi, the least

squares method provides unbiased estimators of β0 and β1 that have minimum variance
among all unbiased linear estimators. The normal error regression model is as follows:
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Yi = β0 +β1 Xi+εi

….(6.12)

Where:
Yi is the observed response in the ith trial,

β0 and β1 are parameters,
Xi is a known constant, the level of the predictor variable in the ith trial,

εi are independent N(0,σ2),
i = 1……, n.
The regression model implies that the Yi are independent normal random
variables, with mean E (Yi) = β0 +β1 Xi and variance σ2. The normality assumption for the
error terms is justifiable in many situations because the error terms frequently represent
the effects of factors omitted from the model that effect the response to some extent and
vary at random without reference to the variable X. When the functional form of the
probability distribution of the error terms is specified, estimators of the parameters β0 , β1
and σ2 can be obtained by the method of maximum likelihood.
Essentially, the method of maximum likelihood chooses as estimates those values
of the parameters that are most consistent with the sample data. The concepts presented
for maximum likelihood estimation of a population mean carry over directly to the
estimation of the parameters of normal error regression model. For this model, each Yi
observation is normally distributed with mean β0 +β1 Xi and standard deviation σ.
In general, the density of a function YI for the normal error regression model is as
follows utilizing the fact that E (Yi) = β0 +β1 Xi and σ2(Yi) = σ2:
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fi =

 1  Y − β 0 − β1Χ i  2 
1
exp −  i
 
σ
2πσ
 
 2 

(6.13)

The likelihood function for n observations Y1, Y2… ,Yn is the product of the
individual densities. Since the variance σ2 of the error terms is usually unknown, the
likelihood function is a function of three parameters, β0, β1, and σ2.:
n

L( β 0 , β1 , σ 2 ) = ∏
i =1

L( β 0 , β1 , σ 2 ) =

1
 1
(Yi − β 0 − β1Χ i )2 
exp −
2 1/ 2
2
(2πσ )
 2σ


1
 1
exp −
2 n/2
2
(2πσ )
 2σ

n

∑ (Y − β
i =1

i

0

(6.14)

2
− β1Χ i ) 


(6.15)

The values of β0, β1, and σ2 that maximize this likelihood function are the
maximum likelihood estimators and are denoted by β̂ 0 , β̂1 and σˆ 2 respectively. These

estimators

can

be

Parameter

found

analytically,

and

they

are

as

follows:

Maximum Likelihood Estimator

β0

β̂ 0 = b0

β1

β̂1 = b1

σ2

σˆ 2 = Σ(Yi - Yi )

1..n

Thus the maximum likelihood parameters of β0 and β1 are the same estimators as
provided by the method of least squares. Here maximum likelihood estimator σˆ 2 is
biased, and ordinarily the unbiased estimator MSE is used. Note that the unbiased
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estimator MSE differs but slightly from the likelihood estimator σˆ 2 , especially if n is not
small:
2
 n ∧
MSE = 
σ
 n−2

6.2.3

(6.16)

Multiple Regression Models – Surface Models

Every so often the linear regression model may not suffice to delineate the nature
of the data that one is trying to model. The reason is two-fold,


Either the response variable in the model does not relate to only one parameter but
may be dependent on several factors in reality.



There is also the plausible causality between two or more predictor variables. These
are termed statistically as interactions between the factors.
When scenarios like these arise, we adopt multiple linear regression models also

called surface models (the reason being that the fitted regression model forms a surface in
the n-dimensional space). In general, we term all models as multiple linear regression
models even if they contain quadratic factors or exponential terms. This is made clear
further on in this chapter.
We may represent the multiple regression model as
Yi = β 0 + β 1 X i1 + β 2 X i 2 + β 3 X i 3 + ............. + β ip X ip + ε i

where
YI is the predicted variable,
Xi1 – Xip: are the predictor variables,
β1 - β2 are the regression coefficients.
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(6.17)

In order to simplify the explanation let us consider the case of bivariate
regression. In this case Yi is dependent on two variables represented as Xi1 and Xi2. The
regression model takes the form
Yi = β 0 + β1 X i1 + β 2 X i 2 + ε i

(6.18)

Here the coefficients β1 and β2 represent the variability of Xi1 and Xi2 with
changes in Yi. In other words the β1 denote the per unit change in the value Yi for a small
change in the value of Xi1 provided Xi2 is held constant. The vice versa is the definition
for β2. εii represents the error in the estimate for Yi.
6.2.3.1

Estimating variability and multiple correlation coefficient

We define the multiple regression correlation coefficient R2 as a measure of the
prediction of Y obtained from the regression equation. If Y is perfectly predicted then R2 =
1. If the multiple regression equation predicts no better than the equation Y = Y , then R2
= 0. The proportion of the variability of Y accounted for by regression on p predictor
variables is given by
RY2.12.... p =

where SSreg =

∑ (Yˆ −Y )
i

2

SSreg
SS y

(6.19)

is the amount of variability in Y accounted by regression.

The variability of Y defined as SSy is partitioned into two main parts SSreg and
SSerror. The first is the variability by regression alone and the second is the error or
residuals. SSreg for multiple regression with p predictor variables with completely
uncorrelated variables leads to non-overlapping error components associated with each of
the predictors. Hence the total variability is the sum of individual variability for each
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predictor variable. However, if the variables are correlated then we need the regression
coefficient to be adjusted to reflect the true variability and goodness fit estimate. For our
purposes to determine adjusted R2 we use
SSerror
2
Radj
= 1−

( N − 1 − p)

SS y

(6.20)

( N − 1)

where N is the sampled population size and p is the number of predictor variables
6.2.3.2

Estimation of the regression coefficients

We may represent the regression equation in matrix terms as follows (assuming
two predictor variables for illustration purposes)
Y1 
Y 
 2
Y3 
 
.
Yn 

=

1 X 11 X 12 
1 X
X 22 
21

1 X 31 X 32 


.
. 
.
1 . X n1 . X n 2 

X

 β1 
β  +
 2
 β 3 

ε 1 
ε 
 2
ε 3 
 
ε 4 
ε 5 

(6.21)

This forms a set of linear equations that needs to be solved to determine the regression
coefficients. The equation may be represented as
Y = BX + ε

(6.22)

Let X’ represent the transpose of matrix X. Similarly β’ and Y’ represent the respective
matrix transposes for β and Y. Therefore we have
Y ' = [Y1 Y2 Y3 . Yn ]

(6.23)

β ' = [β1 β 2

(6.24)

β3 ]

and X’ as
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 1
X ' =  X 21
 X 31

1

1

1

1

X 22
X 32

X 23
X 33

X 24
X 34

.
.

1 
X 2 n 
X 3n 

(6.25)

We can then determine the coefficient matrix β to be given by

β = ( X ' X ) −1 X 'Y

(6.26)

The various statistics are then given by
ESS = β ' X 'Y − nY 2

(6.27)

TSS = Y 'Y − nY 2

(6.28)

ESS
TSS

(6.29)

R2 =

R2

F=

(k − 1)
(1 − R ) /(n − k )
2

2
Radj
= 1 − (1 − R 2 )

n−k
k −1

(6.30)

(6.31)

where n is the number of observations and k is the number of variables involved in the
regression equation. The value of R2 approaching 1 shows a very good fit for the data. To
formally verify the goodness fit we determine the equivalent F-statistic. A high value for
the F-statistic is indicative of a good fit and a low value closer to 1 is indicative of a bad
regression fit for prediction.

6.3

Selecting the Best Regression Equation for Prediction
Sometimes the criterion of interest is predicted by developing a regression

equation containing a subset of the potentially useful predictor variables that are
available. A number of automated procedures have been developed to produce the best
possible predictions with regression equations that contain relatively few predictors.
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These procedures include


Forward selection



Backward elimination



Stepwise regression.
With these procedures it is often possible to select a subset of the potential predictors

that accounts for nearly as large a proportion of the variability in Y as does the entire
pool of predictors.

6.3.1 Forward Selection
In this procedure, one variable at a time is used to build the regression equation.
Initially the predictor with the highest correlation (positive or negative) is selected. If it
fails to meet the criterion for inclusion, the procedure ends with no predictors in the
equation, and the final equation is
Yi = Y

..(6.32)

If the first predictor meets the criterion, on the next step a second predictor is
selected and tested to determine whether it should be entered into the equation. The
predictor selected is the one that would result in the greatest increment in R2 if added to
the equation. If the second predictor does not meet the criterion for inclusion, the
procedure terminates with only a single predictor in the equation. If it does meet the
criterion, on the third step, a third predictor is selected and tested, and so on. At each
step, a partial F test is performed on the selected variable, and the criterion for inclusion
is stated in terms of the critical value or the significance level of the F. In forward
selection and stepwise regression, a liberal criterion for entering variables into the
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equation is often employed. This will generally allow the investigation of more variables
than would normally be used, so that a number of possible equations can be considered.
It should be noted that for procedures like forward selection, the usual
significance levels obtained from the F distribution are not appropriate. This is because
at each step a number of possible predictors are examined and only one- the one that
produces the greatest increment in R2 or, equivalently, the one that has the largest partial
F- is tested. If only a single predictor variable is to be chosen from a pool of m possible
predictors, the situation is analogous to choosing the largest member of a family of m
contrasts and testing it for significance.

6.3.2 Backward Elimination
Backward elimination begins with all the predictors in the equation and removes
them one by one until the final equation is obtained. At each step, the predictor in the
equation that produces the smallest increment in R2 is tested to determine whether it
should be removed from the equation. Again the criterion for removal is generally stated
in terms of the significance level of a partial F test. If the selected variable is removed,
another predictor is selected and tested on the next step. The procedure terminates when
a predictor that has been selected for testing is not removed from the equation; it and all
other predictors remaining in the equation are included in the final regression equation.

6.3.3 Stepwise Regression
Stepwise regression is a combination of forward selection and backward
elimination. The procedure is essentially the same as the forward selection with the
exception that after each new predictor has been added to the regression equation, all the
predictors already in the equation are reexamined to determine whether they should be
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removed. A partial F test is performed on the predictor already in the equation that
produces the smallest increment in R2. If the predictor no longer satisfies the criteria for
inclusion, it is removed from the equation. Statistical packages allow the user to set the
significance levels for entering or removing a variable. The F for entering the variables
into the equation should be set at least as high as the F for removing them. Otherwise,
variables may be cycled in and out of the equation.
It is not difficult to see why it is sometimes desirable to remove a predictor that
had been entered early in the analysis. For example, suppose that X5 is highly predictable
from X4 and X9 but is more highly correlated with Y than either of them. Even though X5
may enter the equation early because of its high correlation with Y, it will become
superfluous after X4 and X9 are entered. That is even if X5 contributes significantly to the
predictability of Y by itself, it may not make a significant contribution over and above the
predictability provided by the other two variables.
Again it is important to emphasize that when predictor variables entered into the
equation are selected from a larger pool, the significance levels printed out by stepwise
programs are not ‘real’ p values. Because many practitioners seem to be unaware of this
fact, stepwise regression outputs are often misinterpreted.
Finally we again emphasize that the sole motivation for the automated procedures
described in this section is to develop useful prediction equations that include subsets of
the available variables.

6.4

Development of Model
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We needed to develop vertical atmospheric profiles for wind, temperature and
pressure. As outlined earlier on in this chapter our first stage in this process is to analyze
the data. We first determine the variations of temperature, pressure and wind with
increasing altitude. We plotted graphs to determine the variation. Figure 6.4-6.6 shows
the individual variations of temperature, pressure and wind with height.
Temperature vs Altitude
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Figure 6.4 Graph showing variation in temperature with altitude

Pressure vs Altitude
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Figure 6.5 Variation of Pressure with Altitude

The graph for pressure (Figure 6.5) shows the greatest linearity with altitude.
Hence we choose pressure as the independent variable and expressed all other parameters
in terms of pressure. The basic philosophy is to fit regression models to predict pressure
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changes with altitude and then determine the corresponding values of temperature and
wind based on generated values of pressure. We fit normal or Gaussian mutators to
generate different but close values around the mean value of pressure in a given day at
the ground level. The purpose of mutations is to generate a new set of test trajectories.
We then predict the value sets as described above.
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Figure 6.6 Variation of Wind Speed with Altitude

6.4.1 Pressure Model
The following fitted models presented in this section provide prediction for a
single day, the chosen day is 28th May 1996. The subsections explain how we fit a model
for predicting pressure, temperature and wind conditions.
We first ran a correlation between pressure and altitude. We obtained the index as
CORRpres,wind = -0.99923. This is indicative of a possibly high probability of linearity
between the two factors. Hence we choose a linear regression function to predict pressure
based on altitude. The fitted regression equation may be represented as
pressure = b1 (alt ) + c1

..(6.33)

Solving we get b1 = -0.09795 and c1 = 969.2212. Hence the equation is
pressure = − 0.09795(alt ) + 969.2212
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..(6.34)

In order to test to goodness fit we determine the correlation regression coefficient
and the F-statistic, the values found were R2 = 0.999 and F-stat = 124860. Both these
values indicate a very good regression fit between the predicted (dependent) and
predictor (independent) variables.

6.4.2 Temperature Model
To determine temperature variation with altitude, we ran a correlation with
pressure and altitude. The respective correlation coefficients obtained were CORRtemp,press
= 0.95 and with altitude CORRtemp, alt = -0.9574. We shall now adopt a forward regression
methodology. Develop a model with only altitude as a parameter. The correlation
regression coefficient R2 = 0.9164. This is a good fit but we decided to introduce pressure
in the equation too and find out if there is an improvement in prediction. Now the
regression coefficient improved to R2 = 0.9448. This is a significant improvement over
the previous prediction.
We investigated whether temperature varies linearly with a transformed variable
(like either log(alt) or (alt)2). In fact the temperature had a better correlation with alt2. We
now did stepwise regression. We needed to determine if all the factors contributed
towards the prediction. When adopting the stepwise regression methodology we
determined that the combined contribution of pressure and height is better in predicting
the temperature than alt2. The equation is
temp = −0.21257( pressure) − 0.02547(alt ) + 225.5906

..(6.35)

The fitted regression plot function visualized as a surface forms a plane in the 3-D space.
This is as shown in the figure below
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Figure 6.6: Surface Plot of Temperature with Pressure and Altitude

6.4.3 Wind Model
The challenge was to model wind values in terms of altitude, pressure and
temperature. Wind’s vicissitudes in values needed some form of transformation to be
applied to the predictor and response values to try and conform it to as near linearity as
possible. We adopted certain standard transformations like log, exponential, square root
and others. There was a great degree of randomness in the values for wind. Stepwise
regression

was

then

performed.

The

fitted

regression

equation

was

wind = 20383.21 + 21 * log(temp) − 2045765 * (1 / Pr essure) − 3876 * log( pressure) .(6.36)
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6.5

Generating Values
There are two approaches for developing models for predicting atmospheric

conditions. One model is to develop atmospheric conditions similar to mean monthly
wind and pressure. The second model is to have a new model generated for each day and
predict for that particular day. Since the DOLILU II system required to have near real
time situations to test, and as mean monthly atmospheric conditions do not capture the
nuances in atmospheric conditions on a particular day, we decided on having a separate
model for each day.
Having predicted the equations in the preceding subsections we shall now
generate input conditions to form different test suites. One major advantage with the
second approach is we generate closely related input trajectory parameters, which helps
us in creating an oracle that unambiguously decides on the output generated.
We now fit a mutator, say a normal mutator, that randomly generates pressure
values in range at the ground level. We then generate the corresponding values of for
pressure, wind, and temperature based on the values generated.
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7.0

Chapter 7.0: Conclusions and Further Work
In this thesis we have attempted to address three primary issues involved when

assessing software,


A framework of assessment. We used a Bayesian framework to incorporate our
knowledge of the system into our assessment model. We needed to determine how we
could assign priors to reflect the belief in our system. We investigated and determined
that we may assign values for p, q based on mean probability of failure and the
tolerance for variance.



Enhancing the speed for test execution. Apart from vertical slicing, we attempted at
alternative schemes for enhancing speed for execution. Monotonic transformations
like changing numerical precision could enhance the speed. But we couldn’t
incorporate these changes permanently to the software. If we needed to do so, we
required an oracle that decides whether the output was incorrect. With an occurrence
of an error the oracle then runs original program segment to determine the correct
output.



Automated generation of test cases.
The first two address the economic feasibility for testing software, especially high

assurance software. The last issue deals with automating generation of test cases for
ensuring the reliability of the software when there is scarcity of previous data.
We developed a statistical framework for assessing software reliability of a high
assurance system DOLILU II. We used a Bayesian Inference Framework, primarily
because of the use of subjective prior knowledge in the reliability assessment model.
Bayesian methods not only provide better interpretation of test results but also achieve it
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with fewer test executions. A comparison between Random Sampling and Bayesian
methodologies clearly shows a superior framework for assessment when using Bayesian
Statistics.
One of the important areas for further research would be how to translate different
methodologies of quality assurance into prior beliefs for the software? For Example if the
specification for the software was extensively exercised, how could this translate into a
belief within the assessment model. How could bayesian statistics support analysis in an
earlier stage in the software lifecycle?
It is clear that no single assessment method is capable of an accurate prediction of
software quality. We could further research into marrying different methods like formal
verification, testing coupled with bayesian framework to achieve a better framework
which assesses high assurance software economically, and in a reasonable time frame.
We also discussed methods for enhancing the speed for each test execution. We
focused primarily on program slices (semantic transformation), that are partial programs,
which are capable of executing independently. The union of all the outputs produced by
the individual slices forms the output of the original program.

We also suggested

changes for numerically intensive slices to further enhance the speed.
Research could be directed on how we may achieve this. We need to research into
applicability of the transformation with their criterion of inclusion, in other words what
should be an acceptable degree of latitude one may give to these transformed
computations so that they would not adversely affect the output. Research could be done
also in predicting the change in the output for the proposed changes.
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One aspect that wasn’t addressed in this thesis is generation of a test oracle. An
oracle unambiguously decides whether a given output is correct or incorrect. For
DOLILU II system the generated outputs for any two input trajectories are expected to be
close for near similar input conditions. An oracle could simply decide on an erroneous
output by determining the difference in the two simulated outputs for closely related
inputs. Research can be done further on generating an automated oracle on the
aforementioned premise. One has to decide what statistical distance would qualify to
define the degree of closeness for the inputs and the outputs.
There are ample opportunities were we could apply a different approach for
assessing. We could also look into genetic algorithms, which may be used to generate test
suites for a program. Genetic algorithms are learning based algorithms, which continually
enrich themselves. We could research into the applicability of these algorithms for test
case generation based on criterion like logical path coverage and others.
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Appendix A
We adopted a tabular form of representation for ease of explanation. Consider
table A.2, which provides the proof for the evaluation of rule S1 (pitch and yaw I-load
with Sail envelopes). The format is as follows, each procedure call forms a separate row
in the table. The keyword procedure and a descriptive name delineating the purpose of
the procedure precede them. Variables declared locally within the procedure are defined
in the row immediately following the procedure. Variables indicated as global are either
defined as common in FORTRAN (or passed by reference in C) to the function.
When DIVDT is invoked the first procedure executed is to set up input files for
DIVDT’s proper functioning. If any of the input files are missing, DIVDT terminates the
evaluation process and an appropriate message is displayed or logged in a file. This
procedure is shown in row 1 of table A.2.
The next procedure called checks for the format of the input trajectory and limit
files. In order to maintain consistency in representing data for trajectories and input files,
NASA adopted a standard method of representation. If any of the files deviate from their
expected format or if there are missing values or an incorrect data type (e.g. a float value
is expected in the file but textual string is found) DIVDT terminates the evaluation
process and logs the error in a file. The file contains information on where the error
occurred, the filename and the line at which the error occurred, the type of error that
caused the termination. This is procedure in row 2 in table A.2.
The third row in table A.2 indicates reading in the input limits for each individual
rule. Although the limits for all the rules are read in, when vertically slicing only
variables that affect the evaluation of a specific rule are required. These variables are
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indicated in the succeeding row. Allocations are done on the heap so that the values may
be passed on to evaluation procedure.
Rows 5 through 15 are executed in a loop. This is shown alongside the table with
an arrow starting at row 15 and ending in row 5. This loop terminates with the end of the
trajectory files. Trajectory files are large and cannot be stored in memory. Hence DIVDT
loops through each point in the trajectory file. Every point in the trajectory file is stored
in specified format referred to as a record. Every record in the file is preceded by a
textual line, indicating which record type to use based on which stage (first stage, preorbital insertion or orbiting stage) in the flight trajectory is the evaluation taking place.
The record names used are


STDRCD:- this indicates the standard record format for the first stage conditions in
the trajectory.



SRBSTD:- indicates the standard record format for pre-orbital insertion stage in the
trajectory.



MECSTD:- indicates the standard record format for the orbiting stage.



SRBSUP:- this is a supplementary record format required for certain rules during preorbital insertion stage.



MECSUP:- supplementary record format required for certain rule evaluations during
the orbiting stage.
Each record is an array and follows a common naming convention. Record names

are of one of the following types STDRCD_XXX, SRBSTD_XXX, MECSTD_XXX,
SRBSUP_XXX and MECSUP_XXX. Here _XXX = DOLIT to indicate SVDS simulated
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trajectory for day-of-launch conditions, or _XXX = DADS to indicate DADS simulated
trajectory or _XXX = REFT indicating reference trajectory.
Row 5 in table A.2, refers to the procedure call that reads in SVDS trajectory
record into the appropriate array, followed by DADS trajectory record (row 7 in table
A.2) and finally Reference trajectory record (row 9 in table A.2).
Row 12 calls procedure read DADS I-Loads (guidance commands) which reads
the corresponding DADS I-Loads from the dads_iloads file into ILRECD array.
Row 14 in table A.2 calls procedure evaluate ruleS1. This procedure evaluates the
rule for the given point in the trajectory. It stores percentage exceedance and the
reference values. Once the evaluation is completed for all points in the trajectory, the data
is stored in files (ASCII for textual files like detailed summary and binary for plot files).
Row 16 in table A.2 calls DIVDTPLT to generate the plot files.
We can repeat the same procedure for the other rules.

Table A.2 Rule S1
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read_Input_File_Limits
4 ARV[51]
PSI_LOW_LIM[51]
PSI_HI_LIM[51]
THET_HI_LIM[51]
THET_LOW_LIM[51]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
11 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
12 Procedure Read DADS_Iloads
13 ILRECD[200]
14 Procedure Evaluate RuleS1
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

15 PSI_ACTUAL , PEREXCEEDANCE [90] (global), REFVALUES[90](global)
THET_ACTUAL,
RESULT[90](global)
16 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.3 Rule S2
1 Procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read_Input_File_Limits
4 QBR_LIM
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
11 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
12 Procedure Evaluate_RuleS2
13 QBAR_ACTUAL , PERCENTEXCEEDANCE[90], REFVALUES[90]

RESULT[90]
14 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.4: Rule S3
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read_Input_File_Limits
4 ALD_LIM_LOW
ALD_LIM_HI
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS3
12 ALD_ACTUAL (iterative process evaluating the rule for each record in the i/p traj.)
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT
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Table A.5: Rule S4
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Read Limits RuleS4
4 BED_LIM_LOW
BED_LIM_HI
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
11 Evaluate RuleS4
12 BED_ACTUAL (iterative process evaluating the rule for each record in the input trajectory)
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.6: Rule S5
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS5
4 PD_LIM_LOW
PD_LIM_HI
QD_LIM_LOW
QD_LIM_HI
RD_LIM_LOW
RD_LIM_HI
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS5
12 ROLL_RATE (iterative process evaluating the rule for each record in the i/p traj.)
YAW_RATE
PITCH_RATE
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT
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Table A.7: Rule S6
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS6
4 DELTA_WIND_MARGIN
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS6
12 Wind_Margin
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.8: Rule S7
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS7
4 ARV[50]
ELVHM_INB_SYST_LIM_LOW[50]
ELVHM_OUTB_SYST_LIM_LOW[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS7
12 Array_Size
Elvm_Left_Inboard
Elvm_Right_Inboard
Evlm_Left_Outboard
Evlm_Right_Outboard
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.9: Rule S8
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS8 (VENTDATA)
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

4 NMCH (number of Mach Values)
MACH (MACH number)
NBET (number of Batches)
PTS (number of Points)
CALD (Center Altitude)
CBAR (Center Pressure)
ALD (Altitude Coords.)
QBAR (Pressure)
DALD (Delta Altitude (change))
DBAR (Change in Pressure)
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
11 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
14 Procedure Evaluate RuleS1
15 ALPHA
QBAR
RESULT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

16 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.10: Rule S9
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS9
4 ARRAY_SIZE
MACH_REF[50] (Mach Reference)
MIN_ALPHA_5[50]
MIN_BETA_5[50]
MAX_DENSITY_1[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS9
12 RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.11: Rule S13
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS13
4 ARRAY_SIZE
ALT_LIM[50]
THR_LIM[50]
KMIN_ALT[50]
DEL_ALT_TWO[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS13
12 QPOLY_3_SIGMA
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.12: Rule S14
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS14
4 VP_SIZE (array_sizes)
ZVRT_REF[50]
MIN_XVRT_ALLOWED[50]
PR_SIZE[50]
TIME_REF[50]
MIN_PRANGE[50]
PL_SIZE[50]
PLONG_REF[50]
MIN_PLAT_ALLOWED[50]
MAX_PLAT_ALLOWED[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS14
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

12 XVRT
ZVRT
YVRT
HPLN_PRANGE
HPLN_PLAT
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.13: Rule S15
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS15
4 WTZMAR
MARGIN_LIM
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS15
12 WEIGHT_MARGIN
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.14: Rule S16
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS16
4 ADI_TIME_LIM
PD_ADI_LIM_LOW
PD_ADI_LIM_HI
QD_ADI_LIM_LOW
QD_ADI_LIM_HI
RD_ADI_LIM_HI
RD_ADI_LIM_LOW
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS16
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

12 YAW_RATES
PITCH_RATES
ROLL_RATES
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.15: Rule S19
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS19
4 ARRAY_SIZE
WIND_ALT[50]
WNDNT_LIM_LOW[50]
WNDNT_LIM_HI[50]
WNDET_LIM_HI[50]
WNDET_LIM_LOW[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Read DADS_Iloads
12 ILRECD[200]
13 Procedure Evaluate RuleS19
14 WND_EAST_CPMT
WND_NORTH_CPMT
RESULT
15 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.16: Rule S20
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS20
4 TREF_LIM_HI
TREF_LIM_LOW
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate S20
12 TIME_REF
RESULT
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.17: Rule S21
1 Procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Read Limits RuleS21
QPOLY3_SYS_LIM_LOW
4 QPOLY_SYS_LOW
QPOLY3_SYS_LIM_HI
QPOLY_SYS_HI
QPOLY4_SYS_LOW
QPOLY_SYS_LIM_LOW
QPOLY4_SYS_HI
QPOLY_SYS_LIM_HI
QPOLY4_SYS_LIM_LOW
QPOLY1_SYS_LOW
QPOLY4_SYS_LIM_HI
QPOLY1_SYS_HI
THROT1_SYS_LOW
QPOLY1_SYS_LIM_LOW
THROT1_SYS_HI
QPOLY1_SYS_LIM_HI
THROT1_SYS_LIM_LOW
QPOLY2_SYS_LOW
THROT1_SYS_LIM_HI
QPOLY2_SYS_HI
THROT2_SYS_LOW
QPOLY2_SYS_LIM_LOW
THROT2_SYS_HI
QPOLY2_SYS_LIM_HI
THROT2_SYS_LIM_LOW
QPOLY3_SYS_LOW
THROT2_SYS_LIM_HI
QPOLY3_SYS_HI
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate Rule S21
12 QPLOY[4]
THROT[4]
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

THROT3_SYS_LOW
THROT3_SYS_HI
THROT3_SYS_LIM_LOW
THROT3_SYS_LIM_HI
THROT4_SYS_LOW
THROT4_SYS_HI
THROT4_SYS_LIM_LOW
THROT4_SYS_LIM_H

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.18: Rule S22
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS22
4 TDEL_LIM
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS22
12 RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.19: Rule S23
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS23
ACCEL_Y_LOW[50]
4 ARRAR_SIZE
ACCEL_Y_HI[50]
MACH_REF[50]
ACCEL_Z_LOW[50]
ACCEL_X_LOW[50]
ACCEL_Z_HI[50]
ACCEL_X_HI[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate Rule23
12 X_CPMT
Y_CPMT
Z_CPMT
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.21: Rule S24
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS24
4 ARRAY_SIZE
TIME[50]
ALT_PLUME_LIM[50]
LOW_CONST[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS24
12 RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.22: Rule E1
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE1
4 GAMMA_STG_LIM_MAX
GAMMA_STG_LIM_MIN
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE1
12 GAMMA_STG
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.23: Rule E2
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE2
4 ALT_STG_LIM_MAX
ALT_STG_LIM_MAX
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE2
12 ALT_STG
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.24: Rule E3
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE3
4 MAX_DEL_AZI
MIN_DEL_AZI
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]

MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE3
12 AZIMUTH_STG
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.25: Rule E4
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE4
4 ARRAY_SIZE
TIME[50]
EBFB1_LIM_LOW[50]
EBFB1_LIM_HI[50]
EBFB2_LIM_LOW[50]
EBFB2_LIM_HI[50]
EBFB3_LIM_LOW[50]
EBFB3_LIM_HI[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE4
12 ROLL_ERROR
YAW_ERROR
PITCH_ERROR
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.26: Rule E5
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE5
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

4 ARRAY_SIZE
TIME[50]
WFBFB1_LIM_LOW[50]
WFBFB1_LIM_HI[50]
WFBFB2_LIM_LOW[50]
WFBFB2_LIM_HI[50]
WFBFB3_LIM_LOW[50]
WFBFB3_LIM_LOW[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE5
12 ROLL_RATES
YAW_RATES
PITCH_RATES
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.27: Rule E6
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE6
4 ARRAY_SIZE
TIME[50]
DPD_LIM_LOW[50]
DPD_LIM_HI[50]
DQD_LIM_HI[50]
DQD_LIM_LOW[50]
DRD_LIM_LOW[50]
DRD_LIM_HIH[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE6
12 ACCEL1
ACCEL2
ACCEL3
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.27: Rule E7
1 Procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE7
4 ARRAY_SIZE
TIME[50]
PD_LIM_LOW[50]
PD_LIM_HI[50]
PD_LIM_LOW[50]
RD_LIM_LOW[50]
RD_LIM_LOW[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE7
12 YAW_ACT_BODY_RATE
PITCH_ACT_BODY_RATE
ROLL_ACT_BODY_RATE
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.27: Rule E8
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE8
SSME5_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
4 ARRAY_SIZE
SSME5_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
TIME[50] VREL[50]
SSME1_YAW_LIM_HI[50]
SSME1_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME1_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME1_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
SSME2_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
SSME2_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME2_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME2_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
SSME3_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
SSME3_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME3_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME3_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
SSME4_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
SSME4_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME4_PITCH_LIM_LOW[50]
SSME4_PITCH_LIM_HI[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE8
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12 PITCH_RATES[3]
YAW_RATES[3]
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.28: Rule E9
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE9
SRBRC_LEFT_LIM_HI SRBTC_LEFT_LIM_LOW
4 ARRAY_SIZE
SRBRC_LEFT_LIM_HI
VREL
SRBRC_RIGHT_LIM_LOW
SRBRC_LEFT_LIM_LOW
SRBRC_LEFT_LIM_HI
SRBRC_LEFT_LIM_HI
SRBRC_RIGHT_LIM_LOW
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE9
12 RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.29: Rule E10
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE10
4 MISSION_INCLINATION
THET_HI[50]
ARRAY_SIZE
PSI_LOW_DELTA[50]
ARV[50]
PSI_HI_DELTA[50]
THET_LOW[50]
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Read DADS_Iloads
12 ILRECD[200]
13 Procedure Evaluate RuleE10

96

14 YAW
PITCH
ROLL
RESULT
15 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.30: Rule E11
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Read Limits RuleE11
4 ARRAY_SIZE
ELVHM_INB_EXP_LIM_HI
ELVHM_INB_EXP_LIM_LOW
ELVHM_OUTB_EXP_LIM_HI
ELVHM_OUTB_EXP_LIM_LOW
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE11
12 ELV_LEFT_INBOUND
ELV_RIGHT_INBOUND
ELV_RIGHT_OUTBOUND
ELV_LEFT_OUTBOUND
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Table A.31: Rule E14
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE14
4 VREL_LIM_HI
VREL_LIM_LOW
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE14
12 RESULT
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

13 Procedure DIVDTPLT

Table A.32: Rule E15
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files)
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE11
4 HDOT_STG_LIM_HI
HDOT_STG_LIM_LOW
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record)
6 STDRCD_DOLIT[250]
MECSTD_DOLIT[200]
MECSUP_DOLIT[50]
7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record)
8 STDRCD_DADS[250]
MECSTD_DADS[200]
MECSUP_DADS[50]
9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record)
10 STDRCD_REFT[250]
MECSTD_REFT[200]
MECSUP_REFT[50]
11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE15
12 ALT_RATE
RESULT
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT
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SRBSTD_DOLIT[200]
SRBSUP_DOLIT[50]
SRBSTD_DADS[200]
SRBSUP_DADS[50]
SRBSTD_REFT[200]
SRBSUP_REFT[50]

Appendix B
B.1

Solve Integration by Parts
Integration by parts may be done according to the following formula

∫ udv

= u ∫ dv − ∫

I

=

I

= uv − ∫ vdu .

(∫ dv )du .

(B.1)

This implies
(B.2)

We may represent the equation in another form
I

=

∫ uvdx

= u ∫ vdx − ∫


(∫ vdx) du
dx .
dx 

(B.3)

Consider the generalized complete beta function given by
1

B(a, b) = ∫ θ a −1 (1 − θ ) b −1 dθ .

(B.4)

0

We have a>0 and b>0, assuming only integer values for a, b we shall now repeatedly
integrate equation (B.4) using (B.3). Let I denote the final integration result, therefore
1

I = B(a, b) = ∫ θ a −1 (1 − θ ) b −1 dθ .

(B.5)

0

According to equation (B.3) we have

 dθ a −1 
 dθ .
I = θ a −1 ∫ (1 − θ ) b −1 dθ − ∫  ∫ (1 − θ ) b −1 dθ 

 dθ 



(B.6)

Therefore, applying the limits [0,1], we get
− (a − 1) a − 2
− 1 a −1
I=
[θ (1 − θ ) b ]10 − ∫
θ (1 − θ ) b dθ .
b
b
0
1
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(B.7)

This evaluates to
−1
(a − 1) a − 2
I=
(0 − 0) +
θ (1 − θ )b dθ .
b
b ∫0

(B.8)

(a − 1) 1 a − 2
I=
θ (1 − θ ) b dθ .
∫
b 0

(B.9)

1

Therefore

Let I1 denote
1

I 1 = ∫ θ a − 2 (1 − θ ) b dθ .

(B.10)

0

I now become
I=

(a − 1)
I1
b

(B.11)

Using equation (B.3) again to evaluate I1 we get

 dθ a − 2 
dθ .
I1 = θ a − 2 ∫ (1 − θ )b dθ − ∫  ∫ (1 − θ )b dθ 

 dθ 



(B.12)

Therefore applying limits [0,1] we get I1 to be
I1 =

−1
− (a − 2) a − 3
[θ a − 2 (1 − θ )b +1 ]10 − ∫
θ (1 − θ )b +1 dθ .
b +1
(b + 1)
0

(B.13)

I1 =

(a − 2)
−1
θ a −3 (1 − θ ) b +1 dθ
(0 − 0) +
∫
(b + 1) 0
(b + 1)

(B.14)

I1 =

(a − 2) 1 a − 3
θ (1 − θ ) b +1 dθ
∫
(b + 1) 0

(B.15)

1

This implies
1

Let I2 denote the integration in equation (B.15). Therefore I1 is
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I1 =

(a − 2)
I2
(b + 1)

(B.16)

This is clearly seen to be recursive (observe equations (B.16) and (B.11)). In general
Ii =

(a − i − 1)
I i +1
(b + i )

(B.17)

where Ii+1 denotes
1

I i +1 = ∫ θ a −1− (i +1) (1 − θ )(b −1) + (i +1) dθ

(B.18)

0

This continues till the power of θ a-1 becomes 0. Therefore
(a − a + 2 − 1)
I a −1
(b + a − 2)

I a −2 =

(B.19)

1

and

I a −1 = ∫ θ a −1− ( a −1) (1 − θ ) (b −1) + ( a −1) dθ

(B.20)

0

Solving for Ia-1, we get
1

I a −1 = ∫ (1 − θ )( b + a − 2) dθ

(B.21)

0

[

]

I a −1 =

1
−1
(1 − θ )b + a − 2 0
(b + a − 1)

(B.22)

I a −1 =

1
−1
(0 − 1) =
.
(b + a − 1)
(b + a − 1)

(B.23)

Substituting for Ia-1 in equation (B.19) we get
I a−2 =

1
1
.
.
(b + a − 2) (b + a − 1)

(B.24)

Therefore I would be equal to
I=

(a − 1) (a − 2) (a − 3)
1
.......
.
.
.
b
(b + a − 1)
(b + 1) (b + 2)
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(B.25)

If we take a=p and b=q+U then we
( p − 2)
1
( p − 1)
.
.
.....
(q + U ) (q + U + 1)
(q + U + p − 1)

(B.26)

( p − 1)!
(q + U )(q + U + 1)(q + U + 2).....(q + U + p − 1)

(B.27)

B ( p, q + U ) =

This implies
B ( p, q + U ) =

Table B.1: priors for corresponding belief in θ
Value of θ
-2
10
-3
10
-4
10
-5
10
-6
10
-7
10

B.2

Value p
5
8
10
100
120
150

Value q
990
9850
99800
4510488
1997988
990371123

Priors based on µ and σ2 for beta distribution
We know that the mean and variance for beta distribution is given by

µ

and

σ2

=

=

p
( p + q)

(B.28)

pq
( p + q ) ( p + q + 1)
2

(B.29)

We believe that the system has exhibited a mean µ = 10-5. It is required that the variance
be very less to instill better confidence in our belief. Let us assume that the variance be
atleast 10-10. We shall now derive p and q in terms for the mean and variance.
Using equation (B.28), we get
( p + q) µ = p .
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(B.30)

This implies
(1 − µ ) p = µ q .

(B.31)

Therefore
p=

µq
.
(1 − µ )

(B.32)

Now we have variance given by equation (B.29). Using (B.29), we get
( p + q ) 2 ( p + q + 1) =

pq
.
σ2

(B.33)

This implies
( p 2 + 2 pq + q 2 )( p + q + 1) =

pq
.
σ2

(B.34)

Therefore
p 3 + 2 p 2 q + pq 2 + p 2 q + 2 pq 2 + q 3 + p 2 + 2 pq + q 2 =

pq
. (B.35)
σ2

Rearranging and combining terms we have
p 3 + q 3 + p 2 + q 2 + 3 p 2 q + 3 pq 2 + 2 pq =

pq
.
σ2

(B.36)

Substituting for p in equation (B.36) from (B.32) we get

µ3
µ2
µ2
µ
µ
µ
3
3
2
2
+
+
+
+
3
q
q
q
q
q3 + 3
q3 + 2
q2 =
q 2 (B.37)
3
2
2
2
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )σ
Since q>0, the above equation reduces to (dividing throughout by q2 ) we get,

µ3
µ2
µ2
µ
µ
µ
+1+ 3
=
q+q+
q+3
q+2
.
3
2
2
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ ) (1 − µ )σ 2
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )

(B.38)

Combining different parts of the equation, we get

(


µ3
µ2
µ
µ
µ
µ2 
.

)
+
1
+
3
+
3
=
−
1
+
2
+
q
(1 − µ )3
(1 − µ ) 2
(1 − µ )
(1 − µ )σ 2  (1 − µ )
(1 − µ ) 2 
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(B.39)

This simplifies to
3

2


µ 
µ
1 
µ 
 q =
 .
1 +
− 1 +
2
(1 − µ ) σ
 (1 − µ ) 
 (1 − µ ) 

(B.40)

Simplifying further
3

2

 1 
µ
1  1 
 q =
 .

−
(1 − µ ) σ 2  (1 − µ ) 
 (1 − µ ) 

(B.41)

Therefore
 µ
1

 (1 − µ ) σ 2
q=
3
  1 


  (1 − µ 

 

   1 2

 


   (1 − µ ) 

−
3 .
 1  
 

 
 
(
1
−
µ
)

 
 

(B.42)

Simplifying, we get
q=

µ (1 − µ )2
− (1 − µ ) .
σ2

(B.43)

Taking σ2 = 10-10, and µ = 10-5, we get
q = 10-5 x 1010 x (1-0.00001)2 - (1-0.00001)

Approximating to the nearest integer
q = 99997

Therefore p will be
p = 10-5 x 99997 / 0.99999 = 1

If we take σ2 = 10-15, we get q = 9999800000 and p = 99998.
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(B.44)

Table B.2 Variation in tests with decreasing variance, confidence = 0.99, θ = 10-4
VarVariance
-9
2x10
-9
1.25x10
-10
4x10
-10
1.6x10
-10
1.4x10

P
5
8
25
60
70

q

tests
49995 13691
79992 24277
249975 67597
599940 126773
699930 140632

V a ria t io n in T e s t s R e quire d wit h v a ria t io n in ( p, q)
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
(5, 49995)

(8, 79992)

(25, 248875)

(60, 599940)

( 70, 699930)

val ues ( p ,q )

Figure B.4 Showing Variation of no. of test for θ =10-4, C=0.99
with variation in p and q.
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